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The executioner of Tokyo

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Edgewood
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Joined: Jan 28, 2004
Posts: 3906
Location: Colonial Shanghai

Posted: Mar 13, 2005 - 02:00 PM
Post subject: The executioner of Tokyo

I'm interested in hearing from the locals on this one.....

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay is without doubt one of the most controversial military commanders in U.S. history. Dubbed the "father of the U.S. Strategic Air Command" (SAC) and an icon of the U.S. Air Force, Le May is also known as a belligerent Cold War warrior who provided the template for the warmongering, psychopathic Gen. Jack D. Rippereral played by Sterling Hayden in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film "Dr. Strangelove."

LeMay is best known in Japan as the man who took command of the air campaigns against Japan toward the end of World War II. Scrapping the established policy of daylight, precision bombing, he sent Boeing B-29 Superfortresses loaded with firebombs to gut with flames nearly every major city in the country, killing some 500,000 people, mostly civilians, and leaving 8 million others homeless.

His reasoning was clear: "You've got to kill people, and when you've killed enough they stop fighting."

LeMay was proud of the night attacks on Tokyo in which, as the postwar U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey put it, "probably more persons lost their lives by fire at [sic] Tokyo in a six-hour period than at any time in the history of man."

That LeMay succeeded in his task was no accident. Indeed, it was by design, since the first waves of bombers dropped oil-gel fire accelerants, and subsequent waves flew so low that they were able to target fleeing crowds of civilians and napalm rivers to cut off escape routes.

It was, as Rinjiro Sodei, a Hosei University professor of American politics described it, "systematic bombing designed in such a way that no one could escape." Adding that it was "really aimed at mass killing," Sodei labeled LeMay as "the executioner of Tokyo."

But even the carnage of the Great Tokyo Bombing on March 10, 1945, wasn't enough to force Japan's surrender. LeMay's logic was vindicated only after the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused the Emperor to capitulate to American demands for an unconditional surrender.

Remarkably, LeMay was later decorated with the First Class Order of the Rising Sun by the Japanese government, for his work in establishing Japan's postwar Air Self-Defense Force.

After the war, LeMay became the commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, which he rebuilt into "the most powerful military force the world had ever seen," with vast fleets of new Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers equipped with innovative aerial refueling systems and ready for atomic attack.

In 1949, on the eve of the Korean War, the pugnacious general set the tone for the Cold War by mapping out a detailed plan for Armageddon in which America's entire stockpile of 133 atomic bombs would be dropped on 70 cities in the Soviet Union within 30 days.

Under U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, LeMay was even given a free hand to order a nuclear strike without presidential authorization if the president could not be contacted. While LeMay persistently pushed Eisenhower to launch the first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, his genocidal scheming was repeatedly thwarted by the president, whom LeMay described as "indecisive."

In 1961, LeMay was promoted to Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force under the newly arrived young leader in the White House, John F. Kennedy. LeMay soon found himself in near-constant conflict with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Maxwell Taylor, as well as the whiz kids of the Kennedy administration.

There are many stories of LeMay's crudeness in dealing with his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was peevish and often childish when he didn't get his way. If anyone dared to challenge him, he would light a cigar and blow smoke in their face. When he was really angry, he would walk into a private toilet attached to the Joint Chiefs meeting room, urinate with the door open and then flush repeatedly to annoy the members seated next door. He would then return to the table as if nothing had happened.

When the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out in October 1962, LeMay enthusiastically pushed Kennedy to go to war by sending the U.S. Navy and the SAC to surround Cuba and if need be, "fry it." Said LeMay: "We should give the Russians the 'Sunday punch' before they do it to us." After Kennedy wisely resisted the recommendations, and the crisis was resolved peacefully, LeMay called it "the greatest defeat in our history."

LeMay's stance toward Vietnam was typically hardline. Although he argued strenuously early on in the Vietnam War for a more rapid and decisive involvement, he was ignored. In his autobiography "Mission With LeMay: My Story" (1965), he wrote: "My solution to the problem would be to tell [the North Vietnamese Communists] frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the Stone Age."

After LeMay retired from the Air Force, he tried to enter the world of politics. He teamed with Alabama Gov. George Wallace in 1968 and ran for Vice President. In the years following his unsuccessful political campaign, he became a bitter recluse, seldom leaving his home in Newport Beach, Calif. He died in 1990 at age 83.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20050313x2.htm

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Kiwi

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Posted: Mar 14, 2005 - 12:21 AM

And predictably the locals have no response. . . they just don't care to see the contrasts, the parallels.

Was in the gym earlier this evening, watching TV while on the cycle. . .

Checking out one news channel and there is this report on economic development in Shandong. The reporter says something like "Back in the 1940s this was the route used to go and fight the Japanese! It took a full day of marching to travel the 30km. Now a tar-sealed road has been built and the journey takes just an hour." Then on to discussing steel production. How charming.

Hatred can motivate you during a workout, but since I've heard it causes cancer I decided to check out another channel. . .

Its 'news' again, this time about a bunch of peasants in christ knows where who are filming a reenactment of the attrocities the Japanese committed in their village. Not sure if 'Chinese people hate Japanese people' qualifies as 'news', but great stuff all the same! They looked a bif goffy pretending to be Japanese, and the there was a rather amusing part where this old villager plays a Japanese officer ravishing an oversized and wizened female peasant. . . On seeing that bizarre spectable I wasn't sure whether whether viewers were supposed to hate the Japanese or feel sorry for them. Pickings certainly appeared a bit slim in that corner of China.

But it is interesting isn't it, how mainstream Japanese opinion is quite tolerant, while mainstream Chinese opinion is forged from hate and resentment.

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Edgewood
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Posted: Mar 14, 2005 - 01:30 AM

You picked it right. I was (and still am) hoping that at least someone local is big enough to see it, too...

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Andreas
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Posted: Mar 14, 2005 - 02:06 AM

It's very simple actually. Two different levels of maturity. Unfortunately far apart.

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peasant
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Posted: Mar 26, 2005 - 12:46 PM

I think I understand where you guys were trying to get by posting this story and your comments, and asking locals what we have to say about it. And I am not denying that, sixty years after the war ended, still quite a big percentage of the Chinese people harbor the hard feelings, even hatred towards the Japanese, and some with passion. I think I will come back to this topic later if we won’t end up in another flame war here. For today, I think I am going to tell something that probably won’t support what you guys implied, that is, the Chinese people are always small-hearted and unable to let go the past.

Yasuji Okamura (冈村宁次) was the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Force in the last days of the war. Prior to that, he was the head of Japan’s 6th Corp and the commander-in-chief of the North China Area Force, among many other senior positions he held in the Japanese Imperial Army. I understand some people, including a few in this forum, have utmost contempt of the Chinese, but few would deny that the Japanese army inflicted heavy losses to China in both human lives and properties during the war. As one of the most senior leaders of the army, General Okamura should have his share of the responsibilities for that. Especially after he took over the commander of the Japan’s North China Area Army from Hayao Tada (多田骏, once the military advisor to the last emperor Pu Yi, then the emperor of Manchukuo) in late 1940, facing the guerilla wars of the communists and their constant harassment of Japanese supply convoys and road and rail links, especially after the communists organized the so called Hundred Regiments Offensive (百团大战), he personally order a new, harsher aproach in the communist base areas, that is “ kill all, loot all, burn all” (Chinese: 三光政策, 杀光, 抢光, 烧光, the Cambridge History of China Vol.13, Chapter 12 used the term “three alls”), effectively wiped out most of the communist resistance in Hebei and Shanxi areas. Further, after the Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional surrender to the allied forces (though the word “surrender” was never used), Gen. Okamura sent a personal telegram to the emperor, begging permission to continue fighting.

After the war was over, he was tried on war crime charges in China and found not guilty. But he apologized in the court for the sufferings his people caused in China after the verdict. He actually became good friend of the KMT government. He was invited to Taiwan a few times and gave lectures. One autobiography of him said he was hired as the senior lecturer of the “Revolution Practice Academy” to train military officers in Taiwan but he didn’t appear to be really teaching there. But many other teaching fellows from Japan were all recommended by him (it’s called 革命实践院圆山军官训练班 ).

One might argue that this was an unusual example having things to do with the upcoming civil war in China, but overall there were no systematic mistreatment of Japanese POWs after the war ended. They were concentrated in some camps waiting for repatriation. Indeed they were all repatriated back home in a relatively short time. In Shanghai, they were in Jiangwan (one terminal of the light rail) and Wusong waiting to be shipped home. The late history professor Ray Huang at State University of New York at New Paltz was a KMT officer (major) then. He recalled in his essay “Nippon, Nippon” that he and other senior officers were inspecting this POW camp near Shanghai when they found a KMT captain was drinking with a couple of Japanese officers with his money whom he was supposed to supervise. The Chinese officer was afraid he might not be doing the right thing, he tried to defend himself by saying “报告参谋：人家打了败仗，亡了国，实在可怜啦！我不过带他们吃一顿饭。叫他们散散心，也没有旁的啦！” something to the effect that "they were defeated and they were in a position to be sympathized. I just took them for a meal and have some fun, not a big deal". To me it’s quite remarkable considering what a cruel war it had been just a short while ago.

Not every Japanese POW was as lucky. About 600,000 Japanese POWs were held in Soviet Union. Many were sent to Siberia to do the labor. It took them long time to get back home. Many died in the horrible conditions and not too small a number of them are still uncounted for. Japanese army didn’t have a very good record themselves in treating POWs. From taking no prisoners in Nanjing to the cruel treatment of POWs building the Burma-Siam Railways, to the Bataan Death March. Not suggesting it’s wrong, the Jews didn’t stop hunting down the nazis who persecuted Jews half a century after the atrocities were committed.

Of course, we can find many examples of cruelties in China, both in its treatment of its own people and other peoples. But that doesn’t have much relevance with what we are trying to talk here. What I am saying is in response to Edgewood’s story about Gen. Curtis Lemay. It’s by no means trying to justify any kind of hatred. In fact, the Sino-Japan relationship had its honeymoon period in 70s when Kakuei Tanaka (田中角荣) and Masayoshi Ohira (大平正芳) were Prime Ministers. The current abnormal, even hostile conditions between the two countries are not working towards anyone’s interest in a long run but that’s a topic we can come back to visit.

Before anyone comes out to defend Yasuji Okamura, let me add something about him. As with many other historical figures, it’s not always easy to say someone is a total angel or an evil. While one can blame him for many bad things, he was also trying hard to prevent his soldiers from doing bad things, such as rape and lootings. In fact, when the Japanese were attacking Hankou (part of Wuhan), he was the head of the 11th Army, the main Japanese force of the battle. He sent in one battalion of MP trying to prevent those atrocities occurred in Nanjing from happening again. Earlier in Nanjing, they only had 14 military policemen who were busy picking up the Chinese soldiers from civilians. When someone defended some soldiers for gang raping by saying the women didn’t resist, General Okamura said, nonsense, when you were having a group of men holding rifles, are you really expect anyone dare to resist?

The so-called “comfort women” was his brainchild too. I am not saying it’s a good thing but he did this in response to the unusual large number of rapes reportedly committed by the Japanese soldiers in Shanghai in 1932 when he was the vice chief of the staff of Japan’s Shanghai Expeditionary Army. (that’s way before the second Sino-Japanese war that didn’t start until 1937. It was called 128 抗战-January 28th resistance war). He requested the comfort women to be sent as a solution to the wide-spread rapes.

Edgewood
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Joined: Jan 28, 2004
Posts: 3906
Location: Colonial Shanghai

Posted: Mar 26, 2005 - 06:02 PM

Good post, peasant. I was hoping to see you write something here.

I didn't know the story you told, but it does make sense and I don't doubt the truth of it.

Actually, there was very little anti-Japanese hatred in China until recent times, when the RedGods decided to start fuelling the hate machine with propaganda. Previously, the targets were Taiwan and the West. Now China want's something from Taiwan and the West, they have turned the hate onto a new target. The younger people, and those with goldfish memories, will not remember this, I suspect.

I was on a long distance bus, out in the countryside, the other day. They were playing a movie. It was a very recent release, with big production values (but poor script and wooden acting) - obviously a state-supported propaganda film. In it, there was an inordinately large amount of dialogue that went along the lines of "As a patriotic Chinese I should try to kill all Japanese dogs", and "Taiwan has always been part of China, until Japanese dogs stole it", and "Foreigners keep China down, so we should repay them".

The mindless folk on the bus lapped it all up, every line. Xenophobic nationalism kicked in, and within an hour passengers were shouting abuse at me, for being a foreigner in China. It was starting to turn ugly, when I got off.

This wasn't a Mao-era film, it was a recent release.

And I'm seeing more and more of this kind of thing every month, out in the countryside. Something's afoot, and it doesn't bode well...

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fukuman

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Posted: Mar 26, 2005 - 09:15 PM

peasent, i'll trust u. is all the crap about the chinese not abusing japanese prisoners andt trying to re-educate them true. ive seen alot of that story here on CCTV. i learnt many were killed in the countryside reprisals after WW11.

If its true, i admire that. i share no real love of the japanese in that era. 'cept maybe the attitude to women. that would have taken a big heart and real ideological zest.

Like so many things i read on chinese history, im curious about the soviet withdrawl from Manchuria. Because of its indutrial output and huge Japanese arsenal ) it had the potential to be the linchpin in the ensuing civil war. Yet the outcome of whether the Soviets helped the CCP or the KMD is unclear. Lingering pro-KMD co-operation ( and treaty obligations/ speeches?) suggest they didnt help the communists. the outcome and localised evidence seemed to point otherwise. what do u think?
was it, as so many things in chinese history, an incomprehensible mix of both, varying from locale to locale or what?

peasant
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Posted: Mar 27, 2005 - 12:55 PM

Edgewood, I agree with you on your assessment about the increasing anti-Japanese sentiment. One of the most recent examples is the petition to stop Japan from becoming a permanent UN Security Council member. I just checked sina.com where over 2 million people signed the internet petition in three days. I am not sure where this sentiment will lead to but confrontations between the two don’t appear to benefit either of them in a long run. But in a short term, it seems it’s a cohesive force that bonds the people together who otherwise don’t seem to be very solidary. That’s the reason some people think why the government is behind this late surge of strong nationalism starting from 90s as you suggested in your post. While this sounds a reasonable explanation, it might not be the only source for this anti-Japan feeling. The government has been asking a lot of things from its citizens but seldom do people seem so united on one issue. Several other factors might come into play here. In addition to the alleged government fanning of the sentiment, the current international situation, geopolitics, the perceived refusal of apology from Japan, and certainly the historical feud between the two are probably all contributing to it. I hope more people can join in to have some calm discussions in this thread.

Fukuman, thank you for your trust but I am afraid I can’t give you a final answer to your questions. I can only tell honestly what I know but it doesn’t mean it’s non-existent if I am not aware of it. I read in some areas, there were abuse of the Japanese personnel, both military and civilians. To the best of my knowledge, these happened not in the countryside but in cities. There were reports some Chinese officials slept their women too. Most abuses seemed to be non-violent, but one account recalls one Japanese military policeman was beaten often by the locals before the Chinese army came to transfer them to the POW camp, since they thought he was mean. General Okamura ordered his troops no fighting back even when attacked. That might be one of the reasons the Chinese court didn’t convict him. But there were also cases where the isolated Japanese posts, unaware of the surrender, continued fighting and cases where the Japanese got the order to surrender to KMT and refused to surrender to the communists.

I won’t be too surprised if some Japanese soldiers were killed by peasants for revenge but I really don’t know. There didn’t seem to be a large-scale retaliation. First, the Japanese army were transferred and concentrated to the camps rather quickly. Before that, they still had weapons. I would imagine the usually timid peasants would be still intimidated by them. Second, this won’t appear in the official media but the Japanese army did try to win the heart of the locals, also for their only interest. While the images of Nanjing atrocities, Unit 731 are all true reflection of the fact, it’s also a true picture that the soldiers were often distributing candies to the children. Compared with the Chinese government’s forced conscription and forced labor without any compensations, the Japanese army actually paid the peasants if they needed them to do some work. Shortly before the end of the war, the Japanese had this “Number one offensive” (or the Ichi Go). The peasants in Henan actually helped the Japanese to disarm the Chinese troops. This might not be the real representation of the whole situation but perhaps not all peasants hated the Japanese that much that they wanted to kill them. After the Japanese POWs were concentrated in camps, it seems the Chinese side made efforts to prevent mistreatment. I mentioned in my previous post that Prof. Ray Huang (then a KMT major) was sent to inspect the POW camps, the purpose of the inspection was to make sure the Chinese soldiers were getting along with the Japanese POWs. He also mentioned even in the camp, the Japanese soldiers were still disciplined, obeying and showing the respect to their officers and the Chinese officers. He also said he can vouch that by the end of 1945, The KMT army, from top down, few still harbor the hatred to their formal enemy. On the contrary, most were sympathetic to them (here is what he said in Chinese: 即在1945年末季，日人处境凄惨已经被我们从旁看出，我敢于作见证：此时国军上下对过去敌人同情怜悯的多，始终怀恨者至少。即有南京大屠杀此刻已时过境迁，况且目下为我们指挥下之日军未必即是昔日残虐暴酷之日军)。The British author Dick Wilson who wrote extensively on that war praised the Chinese for being generous in his book “When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945”. I know some of you would prοtest if I say the core value advocated by Confucianism which had been the dominant ideology in China is “benevolence” and at least until quite recently, the humanism was highly valued, at least in theory. In fact, Ruth Benedict commented in her book “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture” that benevolence is one thing the Japanese failed to learn from the Chinese.

Wars are ugly. Bad things happen on every side. The Chinese general Sun Liren (Sun Li Jen), the VMI (Virginia Military Institute) graduate, fought bravely in Burma and won the Commander of British Empire medal from King George VI for rescuing the British soldiers, but he also killed Japanese POWs in Burma. But to the best of my knowledge, after the war, there were no large scale of mistreatment of POWs, though some of them had to work. The POWs in Shanghai were helping to build the Shanghai-Nanjing highway.

The CCTV story you saw was the story of POWs in the communists’ hand. In fact, I believe the story was largely true. The communists are known to be good in “re-education”. I think I know the story you referred to but forgot the numbers they mentioned. Something like majority were sent back and a few dozen were tried on war crime charges, though none was executed. The last one of them went back in 1964. The story didn’t mention that the Japanese POWs helped to build the first PLAA flight school. The PLAA pilots in Korean War were trained by the Japanese POWs.

I am also interested in the issues regarding the Soviet’s role in China’s resistance war and the following civil war. I think I know a thing or two but I have to leave that for the next post. But I think you raised some really interesting questions.

fukuman

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Posted: Mar 27, 2005 - 02:53 PM

well, sadly, im crap-out of knowledge on the subject. i just remember a gist of my uni years,. periodicals cost money here and like f*** will i pay money.

peasent, thanks for telling me sth interesting. where do u get ur knowledge? historical references r hard to find about chinese history. u'd be a star in a asian studies, get a job in the UK, man.

gotta love the USA, declaration aside " U got rocket science ( obviously not the chinese) or experience in cutting people up and biological warfare - - --- u get green card and immunity to prosecution"

Sorry man, i know u dont wanna give anything away. but ur sentiments seem a little KMD-heavy.

peasant
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Posted: Mar 28, 2005 - 08:18 AM

Thanks, Fukuman. Not much I wrote here are original. They are just things I read over the years. With the advent of the internet, a lot of information are available online now. I read stuff from Chinese, English and Japanese sources, but just for fun, not trying to make a living out of it. There are things in hardcopies too. If you are teaching in a big university with strong humanities programs such as Fudan (isn’t that your school?), you might try to get access to some periodicals they subscribe. I saw in a thread where you were asking some Sinology resources. For quick reference, you might try www.chinaknowledge.org though I am afraid not much you don’t know there. But they do cover a wide range of topics. For more current, more scholarly coverage of China research papers, you might try www.jamestown.org where they have this section called China Brief, or directly go there by http://www.jamestown.org/publications_view.php?publication_id=4 They have this bi-weekly online journal with about 4 papers in each issue. You can access the complete archives for free too.

I am not sure I am KMT-heavy or not. Personally I feel I am quite detached. But when we are talking about Japanese POWs, it seems unavoidable to talk a lot about KMT. In fact, when I read that part of history, I personally was impressed by what the government did at that time. I don’t think we are hijacking Edgewood’s thread talking about this since the attitude shown by that time is still relevant today.

I promise I will share what I know about the Soviets’ role next weekend. But I feel I want to add a bit more about what Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and his government did regarding the POWs. Upon hearing the news Japan was surrendering, Chiang immediately issued an order on Aug.10, 1945 (the formal announcement didn’t come until Aug.15th due to some ongoing negotiations). Among a few items in that brief order, the number 4 is: (D): Forbid harming the enemy POWs who already surrendered, and make sure all your subordinate officers and soldiers to abide by this order strictly. [（丁）禁止加害投降后的敌军俘虏，特别晓喻所属官兵严格遵守.] At 10am the same day Japan formally surrendered, Chiang made a famous “ to recompense the atrocities with kindness” (以德报怨) radio speech that lasted 11 minutes. The speech was written and broadcast by himself with his strongly accented mandarin that lasted 11 minutes. Let me just translated a few representative sentences here: ….To my fellow countrymen, we must remember: To forgive the past heinous offences and to be kind to others are the extremely highly valued virtue of our nation. It’s our consistent belief till today that only those militaristic warlords in Japan are our enemy, not the Japanese people…… We should absolutely not humiliate the innocent people (my understanding is he meant majority of Japanese soldiers) from the enemy country. We only feel sorry for them that they have been fooled and forced by their nazi warlords, and help them to get out of their own mistakes and crimes. We must remember clearly that, if we repay their past violence with violence, to answer their past mistaken superiority with humiliation to them, it would become an endless circle of sufferings. This is never what we will pursue as an army of benevolence”『……中国同胞们须知﹕「不念旧恶」和「与人为善」是我们民族传统至高至贵的德性。我们到今天一贯地祇认黩武的日本军阀为敌，而不以日本的人民为敌……… 我们更不可以对敌国的无辜人民加以污辱，我们只有对他们为他的纳粹军阀所愚弄、所驱迫而表示怜悯，使他们能自拔于错误和罪恶。我们必须切记，如果以暴行答复敌人从前的暴行，以奴辱来答复他们从前错误的优越感，则将成为冤冤相报，永无终止。决不是我们仁义之师的目的………』. It’s not just words. The actions were very remarkable too. There were 1,283,240 POWs (excluding the POW from the northeast (Manchukuo), plus more than 900,000 Japanese civilians. They were all repatriated in 10 months, not a small task for a country just coming out from a devastating war. They had to use 80% of their shipping capacity and 75% of rail capacity to do the job. KMT complained that more areas were occupied by the communists because repatriating the POWs took too much of their transportation capacity.

Some other numbers before I finish: Some Japanese refused to surrender to the communists following the order given by Chiang. Around 1,500 Japanese soldiers died in the conflict with the communists due to this. For the post war judgment, 650 Japanese were tried, 504 convicted, among them, 149 to death (a report i read said the actual executions carried out is much smaller). The most famous ones are, Tani Hisao (谷寿夫), the commander of Japanese 6th division for the Nanjing atrocities; and two others are two Sub-lieutenants Toshiaki Mukai (向井敏明) and Takeshi Noda (野田岩), the possible victims of their own country’s war propaganda. A Japanese newspaper reported the two were in competition for who killed more Chinese in Nanjing. They were neck in neck with one 105 and the other 106. Recently some people disputed the numbers but it does seem they killed many Chinese prisoners of war according to the speech Noda gave in a school (He was extradited back to China): “ I killed only four or five with sword in the real combat.... After we captured an enemy trench, we'd tell them, "Ni Lai Lai."(you, come) The Chinese soldiers were stupid enough to come out the trench toward us one after another. We'd line them up and cut them down from one end to the other”.

peasant
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Posted: Apr 02, 2005 - 01:13 PM

fukuman wrote:

Like so many things i read on chinese history, im curious about the soviet withdrawl from Manchuria. Because of its indutrial output and huge Japanese arsenal ) it had the potential to be the linchpin in the ensuing civil war. Yet the outcome of whether the Soviets helped the CCP or the KMD is unclear. Lingering pro-KMD co-operation ( and treaty obligations/ speeches?) suggest they didnt help the communists. the outcome and localised evidence seemed to point otherwise. what do u think?
was it, as so many things in chinese history, an incomprehensible mix of both, varying from locale to locale or what?

It took me a while to decide where to start with your question, Fukuman. Let me try to be brief and we can come back to it if you are interested. In fact, there are some recently declassified materials on the behind-scene diplomacy between big powers during that period.

Just as you said, many things in Chinese history are hard to use one word or two to describe. The Soviets in fact supported both the KMT and the communists. Due to their conflict of interests in northeast Asia, Russia and Japan were destined to fight sooner or later (they had a bloody war in 1905 in east Liaoning peninsula). The mighty elite Japanese Kuantung Army was preparing more for war with the Soviets than with the Chinese. In fact, Japan provoked twice but was defeated each time by the Red Army. The crushing defeat at Nomonhan by the Red Army under the brilliant general Georgy Zhukov in late 1938 led to the later Japan-Soviets Neutrality Pact in which Japan recognized the sovereignty and the territory integrity of the Mongolia and the Soviets of the Manchukuo, both were considered to be the Chinese territory at the time. They concluded the treaty because each of them were engaged in other fronts at the time but they didn’t really trust each other. While the Japanese navy was more enthusiastic about going south, the Japanese army never really stopped planning to attack the Soviets and the Soviets knew it. So for the Soviets, the Chinese engagement of the Japanese army was in their interest too. They supported the KMT with military aids, and helped to ship aids from other western countries via Xinjiang when the other routes were blocked by Japan. Their air-force (also called volunteers because of the neutrality treaty with Japan) pilots flew more combat missions than the Chennault’s Flying Tiger though they didn’t get as much exposure. Chiang Kai-shek had quite a few Russian military advisors(the above mentioned Zhukuv was once his advisor too), especially in the early period of the war, in addition to his German advisors. On the other hand, they didn’t appear to provide much tangible aid to the communists.

Along with the surrender of Japan, came the cold war. The Soviet was envisioning a pro-Soviet communist government in North China. They began to give more support to the communists. They were supposed to withdraw from China maximum three months after the defeat of Japan but they had no sign of withdrawing until the early 1946. They denied the landing of KMT troops to the Port of Arthur (Lvshun, now part of Dalian) and several other places. The KMT and the US were afraid the Soviet’s further expansion, US marine landed in Qingdao, Tianjin, Beijing and other places in an attempt to check the Soviets. Then Soviets asked the US to withdraw from China as their condition to go back but it was rejected by the US who said US was in China at the invitation of the Chinese government. In the meantime, the Chinese communists began to establish their grassroots organizations in the formal Manchukuo. The Soviets then all of the sudden announced withdrawal in March 1946, giving Shenyang and several other cities in southern Manchuria to the KMT and Changchun, Harbin and other cities the communists. They finished withdrawing on May 3rd, and it was said they took away the industrial equipments with them (but the area is still the “linchpin” without those equopments for the later war). Though the KMT army captured Changchun from the communists in May 24th, the communists grew rapidly in the countryside and Changchun was besieged until the KMT army surrendered in 1948.

The Soviets gave most of the arms they captured from the Japanese to the communists. According to their documents, they gave the Chinese communist 700,000 rifles, 11,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy machine guns, 1,800 artillery pieces, 2,500 mortars, 700 military vehicles and 900 airplanes. The PLA’s 4th Field Army built up there led by Lin Biao became the most powerful one in the ensuing civil war. Two of the three biggest campaigns of PLA were fought by this army. When they started the Liao(ning)-Shen(yang) campaign in 1948, the 4th Field Army was already more than 700,000 strong. When they came out of Manchuria and started the Ping(Bejing)-Jin(Tianjin) campaign, the army was more than a million strong.

Of course, it’s more complicated than this. The Soviets didn’t give up Chiang’s government until almost its last days. When Chiang’s capital Nanjing fell to the communists, the American ambassador to China Leighton Stuart didn’t go with KMT. He tried to stay to deal with the communists while the Soviets' ambassador fled with the KMT to Guangzhou, the last temporary capital before they went to Taiwan. On the other hand, the communists were flirting with the USA during the civil war too.

Sorry, Edgewood. I think I am hijacking your thread now. I will either stop or start a new one.

Edgewood
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Posted: Apr 02, 2005 - 05:40 PM

No worries. This isn't a hijack - it's a natural and peaceful progression. Carry on...

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fukuman

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Posted: Apr 06, 2005 - 12:41 PM

peasent i meant the news i mentioned was from CCTV9 so tended to talk about the graciousness of the commies, and not mention the KMT. it was the commies i was refffering to , thus thought the answer a bit KMD heavy

An other intersting part is that some of the commies seemed to be quite big admirers of the USA b4 and during the WW11, then fanatical hatered by the Korean war.

I remember that the USA had big machinations in their corridors of power over what to do with Chiang Kai shek, and i think towards the end they realised he was a theiving lost cause. Likewise the Soviets could not foresee a communist victory without the prior establishment of an industrial working class. But in 1947, the US did airlift his troops into the major cities of Manchuria, so he retained nominal control. and i think its right that the commies were not strong there b4. Soon after however all the KMT in the cities were surrounded and cut-off as the commies controlled all the countryside and they all fell, with many switching sides.

the ensuing sweep out from the north was , i once read, the biggest and swiftest advance in human military history. that may be more a negative reflection on the bravery and loyalty of the pre'49 chinese solidier than anything else.

Which brings me to another point of interest. How did the chinese go from being such utterly traeachorous cowards, pre-49 to fanatics willing to die in human waves in Korea for an ideology, not even a country?

ShanghaiUnderground
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Posted: Apr 06, 2005 - 03:34 PM

fukuman wrote:

...How did the chinese go from being such utterly traeachorous cowards, pre-49 to fanatics willing to die in human waves in Korea for an ideology, not even a country?

From having good drugs or easily duped?

And I'm not being facetious.

peasant wrote:

...
Chiang Kai-shek had quite a few Russian military advisors(the above mentioned Zhukuv was once his advisor too), especially in the early period of the war, in addition to his German advisors. On the other hand, they didn’t appear to provide much tangible aid to the communists.
...

You mentioned having German advisers, and this surprised me. Had not known this. Did these Germans have the backing of their home government or were they there/here more as private contractors? Would appreciate a link on this particular aspect.

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fukuman

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Posted: Apr 07, 2005 - 12:35 PM

the Germans were mercanaries but had governement sanction, i believe. b4 and after the nazis. They were highly effective and used a stratagy of building a square of fortresses and barricades then progressively tightening round commie areas. German arms were also important.

Now my memory gets really hazy. The ccp post-'27 were split up in 2 different parts and i read some really good articles about it, but i cant remember whether it was just the urban / rural split or there were 2 elements that had fled to 2 different rural areas. Mao did not have centre stage at this point. anyhow, 1 of them was near enough crushed, mao marched and survived, blah blah blah.

i read about it all in periodicals ay uni, sorry

German aid had to be cancelled later due to the Axis pact, where germany could hardly supply its allies enemy in a time of war.

Henry_Chinaski
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Posted: Apr 07, 2005 - 01:33 PM

ShanghaiUnderground wrote:

Just finished reading "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the China he lost."

A pretty good biography of Chiang that covers many of the posts in this thread, including the advisors, not only the Germans and Russians but also the intrincate relationship with the Americans (Joe Vinegar was quite a character). Have the book available if anyone is interested for a swap.

ShUng, as for some names of German advisors: Alexander Von Falkenhausen was the main one on the 30s. Sponsored by the state. Some of them World War I heroes. Pretty interesting crowd.

Will try to write a more detailed review of the book later on.

peasant
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Posted: Apr 08, 2005 - 08:02 AM

HC is right. The most well-known advisor is Gen. Falkhenhausen. He didn’t leave China until 1938. In fact, the fight near Shanghai from August 1937 to November was advised by him and the elite Chinese troops in the battle were equipped and trained by the Germans.

There were five major German military advisors to Chiang from 1928 to 1938. They were Max Bauer, Hermann Kriebel, George Wetzell, Hans Von Seeckt and Alexander Von Falkenhausen. Most of them were in the capacity of official advisors sent by the German government. The second half from the following link talks about the German military mission to China, 1927-1938: http://www.feldgrau.com/china.html Scroll down to the second half of the page, you will see a brief review of the German advisors during that period. Let me copy a few sentences here to show they had the backing of the German government:

In 1936, Hitler assigned Alexander von Falkenhausen to serve in the German military mission in China. …. By 1937, the Japanese were beginning to pressure the Germans. German advisors in China were detrimental to the Japanese war efforts. Overtly, Hitler told the Japanese that he would curtail and end the German support efforts to China - but on 16 August 1937, he ordered the German military support efforts in China to continue as scheduled.

Though he didn't assign to lead the mission until 1936, he came to China and started to advise Chiang since early 1934.

The WWI hero HC refered to might be Colonel Hermann Kriebel? Kriebel, as may be known, delivered the final German statement to the Allied surrender commission on 11 November 1918 - "We will see you again in 20 years.".

peasant
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Posted: Apr 08, 2005 - 09:51 AM

fukuman wrote:

Japan and Germany signed Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 (later joined by Italy). But the Germany didn’t stop its military mission and arms sales to nationalist government in China. They didn’t really want to see the war between Japan and China. When the war broke out, the German ambassador tried to mediate a ceasefire but failed. It would be in their better interest if Japan could help to engage the Soviets.

One of the reasons that Germans didn’t stop its dealing with China even after the Tripartite Pact was that China was virtually only source at the time of tungsten and other metals that were strategically important at that time. In fact, Japan promised Germany that they would supply that the Germans but they failed to do that. In fact, lack of tungsten did put a negative impact on the Germans’ war effort.

You are also right that with the help of Max Bauer, Chiang succeeded in driving Mao out of their base in Jiangxi in the so called the “fifth bandit suppression campaign”, forcing them to run on that famed “Long March”. Mao didn’t establish his central leadership until during the Long March when they had this Zunyi Conference in Guizhou in 1935, against the will of the representative of Comintern, coincidently also a German, Otto Braun. (Chinese name Li De).

("stratagy of building a square of fortresses and barricades then progressively tightening round commie areas." This strategy is called in Chinese 稳扎稳打, 步步为营. You are quite knowledgeable on this. )

peasant
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Posted: Apr 08, 2005 - 10:05 AM

Wonder what your book said about Vinegar Joe (Gen. Joseph Stilwell), HC. Looking forward to your review of the book.

Heavy American involvement in China’s war against Japan didn’t come until after Pearl Harbor. Their primary goal was to keep the Chinese actively in the Allied war camp, thereby tying down Japanese forces that otherwise might be deployed against the Americans fighting in the Pacific. On the other hand, the Chinese side, after the Pacific War broke out, was more passive to engage in the fight. I think there were two more reasons. First, Chiang knew sooner or later Japan would lose, so he relied more on the Americans to defeat Japan. Similar to 9/11, when the news Japan attacked Pearl Harbor reached Chongqing, the war time capital, the crowd just cheered. Second, Chiang knew his army better than his advisors. While vinegar Joe (Stilwell) advised Chiang to take offensives in both China and in Burma, Chiang argued that better equipping and training the army must precede any major operations against Japanese forces in China. And for that, Americans were not very successful since they failed to deliver as planned the “lend-lease” material and arms due to the logistical difficulties. The tonnage over the Hump was barely enough for Chennault’s Flying Tigers. Plus the personality conflicts between the two (Chiang and Stilwell), they became quite bitter towards each other.

At the same time, Chiang’s government became very corrupted. The American aids found their way into some high-ranking officials’ wallets. More than 80 million of the first batch aid from the US in the form of loan of 24 million USD was transferred into the private accounts of H.H. Kung (Kong Xianxi) and T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen, brother of Madam Chiang). Some of the lend-lease material found their way into the Japanese hands, by way of smuggling of the officials and generals. Stilwell didn’t have much good to say about Chiang and his government. He once said, among the 400 million Chinese, 399, 900,000 are good people. Those remaining100,000 are bad corrupted officials. Similar to Edgewood’s 99.9% rule but he was more positive about our Chinese than Edgewood here.

Not just Chiang and Stilwell could not get along. Gen. Stilwell also was in conflict with Chennault about the priority in the China Theater Operation. It reached to the point that Stilwell had to go. But the damage was already done to Chiang in term of the public relations back in the US since he didn’t stop badmouth Chiang after he was replaced by Gen. Wedemeyer. Some of the American diplomats in China were quite “pro-communist”. The reports written by John Davis, John Service etc was highly critical of Chiang’s government while they had some nice words to say about Mao and his comrades (both were persecuted in larer Mccarthy era). When the vice president Wallace visited China in 1944, he also sent a small dispatch to the communist Yanan. The communists understood that Americans like democracy. Then they told American envoys that, the local governments in communist areas were elected. They had so called “three-thirds” government, namely, the government comprised of one thirds of each of the communists, the non-communist democratic figures, and working class people. While the Chiang was resisting hard to put his troops under the command of the US, communists strongly supported the idea and volunteered to put their army under the US command.

Of course, it took a few more years for the US to totally give up on Chiang. But even at that time, it seemed the decision makers almost reached the consensus that KMT would lose China. When the vice president Wallace was still in China, he wrote back to FDR that Chiang’s government was a backward and ignorant one supported by landlords, warlords and bankers. Our support to Chiang is perhaps a short-term investment. He lacks the wisdom and political strength to manage the post-war China. The post-war leader of China will probably produced from either political reform or revolution. For now, the latter seemed more likely. I guess the sentiment echoes Fukuman’s comment that “towards the end they realised he was a theiving lost cause”.

But in fact, he made many best possible decisions under the difficult circumstances. He made mistakes but he wasn’t at all as dumb as he might appear or some of people (including CCP) wanted us to believe.

I am not avoiding your questions at the end of your post, Fukuman. Actually I will be very glad to respond but I have to do it some other time.

(Stilwell had been a military attaché to China. It’s said he could speak fluent Chinese. But the miscommunication might not be much more if he didn’t know Chinese. Stilwell often accused Chiang of not keeping his words. But often Chiang never promised or agreed as Stilwell thoought. Chiang spoke Ningbo mandarin. He often responded to others by saying 好 (hao, good). He really meant I understand, or I hear you or I see. But Gen. Stilwell often mistook that as Chiang already agreed his suggestions or ideas.

It’s not just Stilwell who misunderstood his words. One of his men did something that made him very unhappy. He called the guy to his office but the guy was trying to defend himself for what he did. Chiang became very angry and barked: 强辩 (qiang bian) that means you are trying hard to make unconvincing excuses. The guy was so scared but later nothing serious happen. He was scared because he thought Chiang said 枪毙 (qiang bi) that means to be shot to death.)

Henry_Chinaski
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Posted: Apr 08, 2005 - 11:29 AM

Hmmm. Your position on Stilwell is pretty interesting Peasant.
From the book I had the impression he was a pretty sharp guy, a very hands on general marked by a "zero bullshitting" policy, which actually costed his job and Chiang's China. Example of this was his disappearance in Yunnan and his trekking in the forests for weeks until showing up in Burma.

If Chiang was not so sttuborn and listened to very relevant points from Stilwell as to how to set up the KMT forces, etc, etc, he would have defeated the CCP after the japanese were ousted. Looks like Chiang used the classical excuse of "who is this laowai to tell me how should I run my forces" not to follow his advice. Some good old Chiang pride. Costed him dearly.

I think Stilwells position regarding Burma made a lot of sense as from a logistics point of view flying over the Hump was inefficient. It took 8 tons of fuel and to deliver 1 ton of boms on the jap's heads, and throughout the war Chennault had to fight hard against Stilwell to get his resources.

Obviouslly he was right that beefing up the airforce instead of infantry like Stilwell wanted was a much more effective way to win the war, as history has proved.

The Stilwell x Chennault relationship was pretty interesting. It is surprising at the time that there wasn't someone overlooking it and coordinating the two guys. I imagine Marshall should be doing that, but as far away as he was, that wouldn't be effective.

To me Chiang's biggest enemy was himself and his stubborness. As a leader his personality and values corrupted the values of the own KMT generals that knew all to well that with Chiang running the show their own views of what was happening would have very little relevance. Chiang was lucky with the americans. It took much longer than what it should for the americans to realize how backward Chiang was, perhaps helped by the little darling Mme Chiang that made it difficult for America to deny help to China.

Chiang in the end was just a warlord with a bit of sophistication, helped by the Soongs and Koongs that gave the regime a western rubber stamped face. He cared for the people as much as all the warlords before him, and the budgets of his government are all but a proof of that. China could be well KMT ruled today if only he understood what the needs of the people were. But stubborn as a locked door, he wouldn't ever question himself about it would he.

ShanghaiUnderground
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