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shanghaibarry

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Joined: May 18, 2004
Posts: 188
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Posted: June 28, 2004 - 07:44 PM

I have read in news (of course not within China) that the da1a¡ 1ama has been calling for a peaceful resolution of the t¡betan issue for a long time, as you have mentioned that as long as t¡betans are living under autonomous status. I think this has more or less been achieved. t¡bet is definitely a runaway land from mainland China.

The key question I have now is, who are the parties concerned that created such tension? What's in the way of peaceful reconcilation?

Another questions I have are:

When da1a¡ 1ama went to India, how old was he? Was he capable of making a true splittist recommendation to "his ministers"? Or were his decisions made by himself? Was he not being able to see what's good for t¡betan people? (In other words, what are his motives?)

If da1a¡ 1ama was not acting out of his own views entirely, why are there so much firing on him? Concerns over t¡betan independence are valid and I agree with what Yin/yang has written in the last post that this may set precedent and throw the country into other problems with ethnically different people ruled within China's geographical sovereignty and this will send further shocks to regional and global political stability.

Many fats presented by both sides may have touched on different allegations, but putting historical issues aside, what's more crucial and important is how best to mov forward for the t¡betan people, and really look after what they really need. A lcountry's eader's mandate is to act in the interest of his/her nation and people, and now that t¡bet is part of China, I assume the t¡betan people's interest are taken care of just like the interest of people from different provinces all over China. I raised the point that I would like to see the different views on modernization and cultural invasion/erosion is to see what viewers of this thread think are the key interest of people over there.

Of course whatever points we raise here would be simply personal views, the best would be to hear from the t¡betans themselves.

fukuman

Wonder Wit

Joined: Sep 18, 2003
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Posted: June 29, 2004 - 09:39 AM

yin/ yang, sorry my interests mostly lie with modern Chinese history and i have litle interest in t¡bet. Im surprised u talk about t¡bet becoming independent again, unless u mean the PLA simply pack up and leave. I think the da1a¡ 1ama declared the use of force to re-gain independence against their religion. Many of the pro-independence fighters ( backed by the CIA) took their own lives in response. (1960?)

Again my memory is very sketchy here, but i beleive the chinese government showed a book ( written by an American) to a US visitor ( clinton?) when they questioned the HR abuses in t¡bet. It detailed the use of torture by the t¡betan religious regime b4 the Chinese took over. it suceeded in taking the wind out of the Americans sails.

" I love t¡bet because of its so amazingly semper fidelis people ... "

D please explain exactly what u meant by that?

yin/yang
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Joined: Feb 21, 2004
Posts: 81

Posted: June 29, 2004 - 12:57 PM

Fukuman, it’s unlikely the PLA will pack up and leave. The chance for t¡betans’ independence will only come when China itself begins to have big problems, the possibility we can’t exclude. The CIA was involved in the rebellion or uprising as you might call but da1a¡ 1ama complained that the weapons they air dropped could hardly be used. In fact, he mentioned there were a few CIA people when he was fleeing to India with the group.

I heard the story you mentioned too. In fact, Chinese publications regarding t¡bet, especially those from before 1980s, always mentioned the tortures t¡betan upper class had for their surfs. I am sure you know in Chinese, we use the same word for surfs and slaves. One example would be that they use the human skulls to make lamps. But if you look at Chinese history, there were many cruel tortures too.

Shanghaibarry, you raised many interesting questions. I will try to share what I know about some of these questions. Like I said earlier, I am not an expert on this issue and I am afraid I am not capable of answering all the questions. But I will try. As you mentioned in your last post, all we say here are just personal opinions. I am open to comments and criticisms. Anyone please feel free to express yourself.

da1a¡ 1ama was born on July 6th, 1935. At the time he left Lhasa for exile on March 17th, 1959, he was not quite 24 years old. In his book “Freedom in Exile, the Autobigraphy of the da1a¡ 1ama” which I have a copy given by a friend as a gift, he had his personal account. I also collected a few Chinese books about the events during that time. And some authors of these books were disciplined for “leaking” the confidential material or they themselves are in exile. At least I am trying to give a balance views on the issue.

After the 17 Points Agreements were signed in early 1951, there appeared to have a period of honeymoon between the two sides. Even for communists, their basic doctrines would be to get rid of the exploiting class, to have the oppressed to “turn over the body”, they seemed not in hurry to do that in TAR. For them, to win the sovereign over the t¡bet was more important. So at the beginning, it seemed they tried not to offend the elite upper class in TAR and they try to use the “United Front” approach. (in CCP organizational structure, from the central committee down to the county level, they have this united front department. They use this department to develop some unlikely allies to serve their purpose). da1a¡ 1ama was given the position of Vice President of the National People’s Congress, though the symbolic one but that would make him to be considered part of the state leadership. He was invited to Beijing and toured some other parts of the country. He had banquets with Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and other senior leaders. It is interesting to read that he said he developed interest in Marxist theory and expressed his interest to join the communist party while he was in Beijing. When the t¡betans expressed the concerns about those reform measures signed in the agreement, da1a¡ 1ama was given the assurance that they can wait. But the communist carders in t¡bet were trained to be very ideological. In their eyes, the surf system in t¡bet is an evil system. The elite and religious people were having a comfortable life at the expense of the slaves. (in Chinese, they used the same word for slaves and surfs-nu li). They were not too happy with the “united front” approach.

Of course, t¡betans, especially the elite class, were never comfortable to co-exist with those communists. They never trusted Chinese. Now they had tens of thousands of PLA, to them, the foreign army, stationed in their territory. It’s true the Qing army had been there to quell the rebellions or drive away the invaders, but they left after the military actions. At normal times, the Qing army stationed in t¡bet was about a thousand or less. When the late Qing Dynasty sent 3,000 more Sichuan army to t¡bet, the 13th da1a¡ 1ama fought hard not to let that happen and when he failed, he had to go to exile to India.

The mistrust was mutual. Though on surface, it seems cordial between Mao and da1a¡ 1ama. When da1a¡ 1ama told Chinese he wanted to go to India to attend the celebrations to mark the 2.500th birth anniversary of the Lord Buddha, Mao talked about the issue in the 2nd plenary session of the 8th Party Congress in 1956. He said, Buddha died 2,500 years ago, (that’s his words, but should be was born 2,500 years ago), Now da1a¡ 1ama wanted to go there to worship. To let him go or not? the Central committee decided it’s better to let him go. It’s not good not to let him go. In a few days, he would leave for the visit. We advised him to go by airplane, but he insisted to go by land. On his way, there will be many spies from foreign countries and special agents of KMT. It’s possible he won’t come back. Not only that, he might badmouth us there everyday (天天骂娘), saying communists invaded t¡bet etc. Further, he might declare the t¡betan independence in India. Or he let his men in t¡bet to call for a rebellion to drive us out. Then he said he wasn’t in t¡bet, therefore not aware of it, hence not responsible. Of course, these are the bad scenarios. If they happen, I am happy too. Our army and t¡betan Working Committee should be prepared. If they attack, we will defend. But we won’t make the first move. Let them do first, then we carry out our counter attack to totally defeat them.

da1a¡ 1ama did try to seek the exile in t¡bet. But after hesitating in India for 4 months, he came back. The main reason might be that the then prime minister Pandit Nehru didn’t want to get in trouble with the Chinese. According to da1a¡ 1ama: “ At first, he listened and nodded politely. But I suppose that my passionate speech must have been too long for him and after a while, he appeared to lose concentration, as if he was about to nod off. Finally, he looked up at me and said that he understood what I was saying. ‘But you must realize,’ he went on somewhat impatiently, ‘that India cannot support you… You must go back to your country and try to work with the Chinese on the basis of the Seventeen-Point Agreement’” The other reason might be that by this time, China reduced its presence in TAR (after the central government found out some of its people was impatient to carry some revolution measures and that made the t¡betan elites to be very fearful. At this time, the central government still wanted to go with the united front approach) and promised that no implementation of the agreements in the next 6 years.

But that only applied to TAR. In other t¡betan areas in Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai, the communists started to do things they did in the Chinese areas, land reform, the turn over the body campaigns. But the resistance was particularly strong. Most of us know the rebellion in 1959 but it started a couple of years before outside TAR. Even without military resistance in Chinese areas, many landlords were executed since at that time, the peasants in the village could decide who should die. Let me copy the words of da1a¡ 1ama from his freedom in exile: “crucifixion, vivisection, disemboweling and dismemberment of victims was commonplace. So too were beheading, burning, beating to death and burying alive, not to mention dragging people behind galloping horses until they died or hanging them upside down or throwing them bound hand and foot into ice water.

The atrocities were committed on both sides. According to this Chinese who was in Qinghai at the time, if the PLA soldiers were captured by the t¡betans, t¡betans cut their flesh and dipped some salt to let the soldiers to eat their own flesh while tying them on a wooden column. When they later took over those places, they saw the soldiers died on the columns, bones exposed, full of their own flesh in their mouths. “Many of my colleagues with whom I came to Qinghai died. If you were captured by the rebel bandits, you were doomed. Many of our men had their bellies cut open, the eyeballs taken out and the balls (testicles) cut out. So we all had to fight hard.”

Of course, those poorly equipped t¡betans would be no match for PLA. They fled to TAR. And many camped in Lhasa. In the meantime, the Chinese asked the t¡betan government to hand over the “bandits” (or freedom fighters you may). So the situation in TAR became very tense by now. There were numerous attacks on PLA in TAR now. By 1959, the rebels camped in Lhasa were so many that even the Kashag government won’t have control over by this time. Somehow when I wrote this, I was thinking of the students camping on Tiananmen Square.

In the meantime, The Chinese side was preparing and even looking forward to the explosive outbreak. Eight months before the final outbreak in March, 1959, on June 24th, 1958, when Mao was talking about the rebellions in Qinghai area, he said, we also should get prepared for the wide spread rebellion in t¡bet (he meant TAR). The bigger the rebellion, the better. There is no question that, as soon as the counter revolutionary forces in t¡bet dare to rebel, the time for the working class in t¡bet to be liberated will come.

The then the general secretary of the party secretariats Deng Xiaoping also said that, let the rebellion get bigger, the bigger, the later reform will be more complete. For now, PLA should not come out. At the same time, they began to send more troops in and prepare for the final military actions. According to a then company officer in 308th artillery regiment, they measured all the positions of the potential targets. In order to do this, they had sometimes to pretend that their vehicles broke down and they had to stop. While someone was pretending to fix the vehicle, they try to observe and measure what they need to know in case they had to shell.

The triggering event was that da1a¡ 1ama was invited to attend a performance at PLA’s t¡bet garrison on March 10th. He was now in his summer palace, Norbulingka that was now surrounded by tens of thousands of excited and emotional rebels. The words were spread out that the Chinese was going to kidnap the da1a¡ 1ama and they blocked the palace and won’t let him go. The crowds got more and more fanatic. They killed several t¡betans whom they thought to be the collaborators of the Chinese. They chanted the slogans for t¡betans’ independence. The exile government observes March 10s as their holiday now.

da1a¡ 1ama didn’t make it to the performance. In his book, he said he asked the his Chamberlain to telephone the Chinese to express his regret and that he hoped the normality would be restored soon and that the crowds could be persuaded to disperse. He sent three senior ministers to the PLA garrison the next day. But he didn’t mention the letter he wrote to general Tan Guansan (in his book, Tan Kuan-sen). In fact, there were three letters he wrote before his departure. We might argue that the letters were not written by him or he was writing letters just try to fool Chinese. But the three letters were used by the Chinese government to try to prove that he was kidnapped by others. His official position was not removed until five and half years after. Then he was called the traitor. It was not that the Chinese trusted him, it’s also that it could better serve their purpose then.

The first letter written by da1a¡ 1ama said he felt shamed about what happened. “the counter revolutionary elements are doing things that do me the harm in the name of protecting me. And for that, I am trying my best to solve.” In the March 12th letter, he said : “ the illegal actions by the counter revolutionaries made me very sad. I asked the Kashag government yesterday to disband the illegal People’s Conference. Those counter revolutionary elements who stayed around Norbullingka should disperse immediately. For the incidents that happened yesterday and the day before yesterday, that in the name of protecting me but in fact trying to damage the relationship between the central and the local governments, I am trying my best to handle”. In the third letter he wrote one day before he was gone, he said he was using some clever methods to try to separate those who are progressive with those counter revolutionary.

When they telegrammed Mao who was in Hubei on an inspection tour what’s happening in Lhasa, Mao smiled and said, finally the day comes. On March 12th, Mao gave the instructions by telegram to his people in t¡bet : “We might be forced (this is good) to solve the t¡betan problem sooner than we anticipated. For the rioting in Lhasa, they are trying to drive us out. These people are declaring the splitting with the central government. Militarily, for now, let’s on the defense. Politically, let’s on offence. We should try to split the upper class, educating the lower class. If they want to flee, let them go. No matter to the south or to India”.

When informed da1a¡ 1ama fleeing, he said, the political situation becomes clear in t¡bet now. This is extremely good. But we could still make use of da1a¡ 1ama. For his fleeing, for our propaganda, we just tell that he was kidnapped by traitors. Don’t put his name into the group of separatists. To counter the enemy’s attempt to use his name to call for the rebellion. For Panchan 1ama, if he joins the rebellion, we won’t let him go abroad but make sure he won’t be killed by us.” He also asked PLA try to act as weak and could not hold Lhasa, giving the rebels some confidence they could take over Lhasa and draw more rebels to Lhasa. So we can wipe them out altogether. In the meantime, they sent three more divisions and two additional regiments from other places to circle Lhasa, trying to destroy all the rebel forces inside the Lhasa. But the telegram arrived a few hours late. By then, the PLA already started their offence and defeated t¡betans in 30 hours, killed 5,360 rebels. But as Mao predicted, the circle wasn’t completed before the offense started. Many rebels fled and carried their resistance in other areas. The military action didn’t complete until 1962.

Will add more details about da1a¡ 1ama’s departure later. And I will also try to voice my views on the culture invasion and modernization Shanghaibarry mentioned a couple of times.

jane_ca

Rocker

Joined: Aug 26, 2003
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Posted: June 29, 2004 - 01:37 PM

Yin/yang, thank you for your response. Another well thought out post.

My last reading about t¡bet, the negotiation was futile because disagreement of preconditions as well as "degree" of autonomy. Given China's current international economic and political status, the only chance for an independant t¡bet is to wait for CHINA to FAIL AND COLLAPSE. (cite of a popular opinion)

On the web there is an article about changes of Chinaese government policies towards t¡bet in the last fifty years. I will try to find it again and share with those who is interested in this issue. As far as i can remember, at the beginning, the Chinese government strategy was to convince da1a¡ 1ama to come back to t¡bet as religious leader to "calm" t¡betans. So many years passed, it seems this will never happen. I believe they start to focus on integration and economic development in t¡bet area WITHOUT hoping his return. Notice last 10 years or so, more federal funds continuously flooded into t¡bet and more Han Chinese migrated into t¡bet to do business and started to reside in t¡bet. Construction of new railroad to Lahsa is also an important strategic move.

I read couple books written by da1a¡ 1ama. I like his teaching in Buddism. I belive there are much more he could do for his own ppl than in self imposed exile. Wish he could return to t¡bet to lead his ppl, to focus on religious teaching and preserve uniqe t¡bet culture. It's really a pity.

If ppl are happy and if we all can live in peace with one aother, border will be meaningless. But reality is far from that. Yin/yang you are right. It's won't be a pretty picture for China and the region if t¡bet becomes independant. But you made an excellent point, bottom line,

Quote:

If we have to lose it, it would be better we end up having a friendly neighbor than a bitter enemy.

The ideal of "大一统" (Great one union) since Emperor Qing is so prevalent in Chiese thinking. We have to live with whatever is "reality".

Personally i wish to see a stronger China as well as a prosperous t¡bet. I must visit t¡bet before set out sail around the world again! Smile

jane_ca

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Posted: June 29, 2004 - 01:47 PM

Quote:

And I will also try to voice my views on the culture invasion and modernization Shanghaibarry mentioned a couple of times.

With economy globalization, influence of other culture seems inevitable. t¡bet is no exception.
Look forward to reading more posts from you Yin/yang. Thanks.

shanghaibarry

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Joined: May 18, 2004
Posts: 188
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Posted: June 29, 2004 - 03:59 PM

Again, another well-balanced post by yin/yang!

I have also read the same autobiography many years ago, based on my memory, if one reads between the lines, the tonality and choice of words in fact aren't that far from what he wrote to the Chinese government regarding the situation outside Norbulingka. There are sense of regret and things getting out of control in his voice. So, that's why I question whether at his age he has all the control he wanted. The atrocities he cited are probably the facts presented to him by his ministers and not entirely the reality. Not for once did I get the sense that he is trying to split up China. Rather it is more like "do whatever good for t¡betan people" being his belief. But of course the same may not be said for the exile government which is led not by him but by an elected group of people. I read somewhere else that some of the younger t¡betans now living in India are developing increasingly violent attitudes towards the TAR issue and that worries the da1a¡ 1ama too.

Eager to read more about different views. Regret that Edgewood does not seem to want to come back with his views. I think Edgewood is concerned over his views may offend the government's cyber police and get himself into trouble. His concern is valid, but I think one need not take side or persuade others to take side in order to have an intillectual stimulating discussion over controversial issues which I am sure that's the purpose we have here.

tangoinasia

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Joined: May 26, 2004
Posts: 123

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Posted: June 29, 2004 - 04:53 PM

yin/yang and Edgewood
Thank U very much. It's very interesting to read this posts.
If U are in shanghai I would love to invite U 2 for a drink or coffe.
Usually its not easy to find somebody in shanghai that can talk not about his boss, the job, the girl he had or the one he is going to have.
Also anybody else on this forum, it will be nice to meet. Smile

Edgewood
FooSlinger

Joined: Jan 28, 2004
Posts: 3906
Location: Colonial Shanghai

Posted: July 09, 2004 - 03:28 PM

shanghaibarry, I'm really not too worried about what could happen to me - the worst that is likely is that I'll be deported. How unlucky would that be?

However, my life is here and so is my girlfriend and her family.

For the record: My phone is tapped (trust me, I have some experience in this field and I know). My mail is opened at the post office. Someone has been inside my apartment while no-one was here, didn't take anything, distured almost nothing, and locked the door behind them (and if you happen to be reading this you barstards, you weren't careful enough!). The local KGB office, or Community Centre, knows way more about me than they've ever been told. And, finally, although I've never myself been harassed, my girlfriend's family has been visited and questioned regarding me. No threats were made, but the meaning was perfectly clear to everyone.

So, I am well advised to stay out of some discussions, and this is one of them. It doesn't mean I don't have an opinion about t¡bet or certain presidents who may or may not have waded knee deep in blood whilst in charge there, just that those opinions are not for public consumption. For private consumption, PM me ok?

_________________
Conlige suspectos semper habitos

shanghaibarry

Barker

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Posts: 188
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Posted: July 09, 2004 - 03:41 PM

ah... i thought they stopped doing those stuff few years back. i know they used to have a big team tapping all foreigners' phone... anyway, valid concern and those are definitely signs... sigh...

yin/yang
Talker
Talker

Joined: Feb 21, 2004
Posts: 81

Posted: July 12, 2004 - 09:08 AM

Let me try to add a bit detail about the fleeing of the da1a¡ 1ama.

The decision to escape was made after the consultation with the oracle on March 17th. The medium, a young monk named Lobsang Jigme shouted : “go! go! tonight!” He also “snatched some paper and a pen, wrote down, quite clearly and explicitly, the route I should take out of the Norbulingka, down to the last t¡betan town on the Indian Border……Just then, as if to reinforce the oracle’s instructions, two mortar shells exploded in the marsh outside the northern gate of the Jewel Park.”

da1a¡ 1ama said he was also aware that “ the Chinese had already considered the possibility that I might try to escape. They must have taken precautions.” When he was crossing the Kyichu River ( Lhasa River), he said “ I was certain that every splash of oars would draw down machine-gun fire on to us. There are many tens of thousands of PLA stationed in and around Lhasa at that time and it was inconceivable that they would not have patrols out.”

He was right. In fact, his fleeing was under the watch of PLA, at least that’s what general Li Jue said who was then the deputy commander of PLA t¡betan Garrison : “On the night of March 17th, 1959, when da1a¡ 1ama and his men was crossing the Kyichu River, our artillery already aimed at them. If we fire at them at that time, none of them could be alive. But the Central Committee didn’t’t want us to intercept them. We sat quiety in the woods, with the help of the moonlight, watching them crossing the river, nervously, with a few coracles (small boat made of animal skins).”

Personally I believe the story, though it would be more interesting to think there were some supernatural forces protecting da1a¡ 1ama, as suggested by some articles, saying for example that there were mysterious clouds over da1a¡ 1ama and his people, protecting them from being seen by PLA airplanes. I am not suggesting PLA were kind not to hurt him, but killing him or even capturing him at that time didn’t serve their purpose. Seeing how influential and what a headache da1a¡ 1ama becomes now, they might have a second thought. But at that time, it seems they just wanted to let him go and then they would have a free hand to do whatever they wanted in t¡bet.

After 1989 student movement, the highest ranking official defected to the West was Xu Jiatun, the head of Xinhua News Agency HK Branch, the de facto headquarter of mainland government presence in Hong Kong before 1997. He was the party secretary of Jiangsu Province in 1959. In his memoir, he recalled a document the central committee cced to him regarding the t¡bet. It’s about Mao’s instruction about how to handle the t¡betans’ rebellion. He recalled how Mao asked PLA to let da1a¡ 1ama flee without hurting or capturing him. Mao thought among the few options, letting him go was the best. Capturing him, the living Buddha for t¡betans, would be hard to handle, and killing him was even worse. As I mentioned in the last post, Mao also planned to tell people that da1a¡ 1ama was abducted by the counter revolutionary elements and indeed, that’s what their propaganda machine did for the next a few years.

The exile government also accused PLA shelling Norbulingka at 4pm, March 17th, 1959, the accusation the Chinese government always denied. In 1993, a book written by a PLA writer who had access to some military records seemed to have confirmed that there was a shelling. The author’s name was Ji Youquan and he was later disciplined for “leaking” state secret. But the revelation, though contrary to what the government always said, seemed also to have exonerated PLA. According to Ji, the two mortar shells were fired by this guy named Lei Huishan. He was a policeman at the Qinghai-t¡bet Highway Administration Lhasa Station. The rebels fired at his staion three times that day. Angry, he used his 60 mm mortar and fired two rounds without the order from anyone.

Another accusation made by the exile government but denied by the Chinese government was the shelling of the pοta⌊a. Again, the shelling did happen according to the book: When PLA tried to retake the Lhasa City center, they were fired by the rebels inside pοta⌊a. Tan Guansan (Tan Kuan-sen), the commander of PLA forces in Lhasa, asked if the 308th Regiment could suppress the fire from pοta⌊a without much damage to the building. Miao Zhongqin, the chief of staff of the 308th Regiment, said that only recoilless guns would do. I know very little about weaponry but it’s said this recoilless guns don’t have much explosive forces but are still very lethal. Then Tan ordered to amass all the recoilless guns from the 155th Regiment, the 159th Regiment, 308th Regiment and the Guards Battalion in the Garrison Headquarter to form a Battalion of recoilless guns. So each time when they saw a fire from the window, they would shell that window. In Ji’s book, there was also description about the shelling of the rebels at Norbullinka after the departure of the da1a¡ 1ama who left on 17th night. The counter offence didn’t start until 20th.

tangoinasia, thank you very much for the invitation. That certainly is a possibility in the future.

digahole, you asked us not to use t¡bet but Xizang in another thread. I hear you and understand that the names mean something. But since the official documents from the Chinese government also use "t¡bet" when they refer to Xizang. I guess it's okay for us to continue to use word "t¡bet".

yin/yang
Talker
Talker

Joined: Feb 21, 2004
Posts: 81

Posted: July 12, 2004 - 09:16 AM

Nick-la wrote:

I managed to get a quote for this one:

"In 1995 the Chinese government kidnapped the six-year-old Gendun Chökyi Nyima and his parents, shortly after he had been recognized by the da1a¡ 1ama as the latest reincarnation of t¡bet's second most important spiritual leader, the Panchen 1ama. In a resolution of July, 1995, the European Parliament called on China to release the family immediately. This family, like many other groups and individuals who have been detained without trial, remains unaccounted for"

Typical Nazi oops I mean Chinese government.

The following is about the boy Nick-la was referring to. It’s from the book “The Snow Lion and the Dragon, China, t¡bet, and the da1a¡ 1ama” by professor Melvyn Goldstein. I will provide the link to this book later. It’s not blocked in China and it’s just tested.
-----

When the tenth Panchen 1ama died in t¡bet on January 28, 1989, the Chinese government agreed to permit the selection of a new Panchen 1ama. Because they were atheists, it made no difference to the Communist party leaders which boy was ultimately chosen to be the new Panchen 1ama, but since it did matter to t¡betans, the selection process would obviously need to adhere to t¡betan customs and norms to some degree in order to ensure that the new incarnation would be accepted as authentic and legitimate in t¡bet. At the same time, Beijing considered it politically necessary that the search process unequivocally demonstrate its authority over the selection of reincarnations, and that the next Panchen 1ama be found in China. Beijing's strategy for achieving these two goals was to constitute a "traditional" t¡betan search team composed of lamas and monk officials of the late Panchen 1ama's monastery (Tashilhunpo) and empower them to employ customary methods (dreams, omens, signs, searches) to identify a set of incarnation "candidates." Once this was completed, a religious lottery would be held in which one of the candidates would be anonymously drawn from a "golden urn" under the supervision of the central government, which would then formally confirm and install the boy selected.[1] The custom of a golden urn lottery was begun by the Qing dynasty emperor Qian Long in 1792.

The problem with this plan was that t¡betan norms required that the new Panchen 1ama be confirmed by the da1a¡ 1ama, and Beijing's plan included no role for him. This was not surprising given the fact that the da1a¡ 1ama rejected both the golden urn lottery and the authority of the Chinese government to approve or disapprove the final selection of t¡betan lamas; he, to the contrary, claimed that ultimate authority rested with him.[2] Consequently, while excluding the da1a¡ 1ama from the selection process simplified the finding of a new Panchen 1ama for Beijing (and reinforced its political claims), doing so was likely to result in the da1a¡ 1ama rejecting the legitimacy of the Chinese-selected Panchen 1ama and probably selecting a different Panchen 1ama in exile. Consequently, the officials of the late Panchen 1ama urged modification of the initial guidelines so that an attempt could be made to reach some arrangement with the da1a¡ 1ama over the selection.

The da1a¡ 1ama also appeared to want to prevent the selection of the next Panchen 1ama from turning into a political circus. In March 1991, he sent a message to the Chinese embassy in New Delhi saying he would be willing to assist in the selection process, and from 1990 to 1993, his elder brother, Gyalo Thondup, urged the Chinese government on several occasions to involve the da1a¡ 1ama by allowing him to send lamas to t¡bet to assist in the search.[3]

China did not agree to this, but it did permit Tashilhunpo monastery's Chadrel Rimpoche, the head of the search team, to contact the da1a¡ 1ama. On July 17, 1993, Chadrel Rimpoche took the occasion of a Gyalo Thondup visit to Beijing to give him a communiqué for the da1a¡ 1ama.[4] Written in the old t¡betan scroll format and referring to the da1a¡ 1ama with the most exalted titles, honorifics, and phraseologies, it asked for the da1a¡ 1ama's prayers and help in attaining a speedy decision in the selection of the Panchen 1ama; that is, it asked the da1a¡ 1ama to cooperate in the selection process.[5] The Chinese attitude at this time seemed to be that it would be excellent if the da1a¡ 1ama was willing to cooperate, but if he was not, China would continue without him.

Gyalo Thondup carried the letter to the da1a¡ 1ama in India, but his response was tough, asking that Chadrel Rimpoche come to India for consultations.[6] Overtly this was not a negative response, but since internal politics in China would make such a visit impossible, it left ambiguous how far the da1a¡ 1ama was willing to go to ensure that the next Panchen 1ama would be chosen without political controversy. This response, which the Chinese publicly ignored, provided the hard-liners in China further evidence that it was futile to try to deal with the da1a¡ 1ama.

Because it was critical from a t¡betan point of view that the da1a¡ 1ama recognize the new Panchen 1ama, Chadrel Rimpoche continued to communicate informally with the da1a¡ 1ama. By the end of 1994 the search team had compiled the list of "candidates" from which the eleventh Panchen 1ama would be chosen, and Chadrel Rimpoche sent the da1a¡ 1ama a letter providing detailed information (including photographs) on about twenty-five candidates. He also informed the da1a¡ 1ama that all signs indicated that one of these boys—Gendun Choekyi Nyima—was the true incarnation.[7] The da1a¡ 1ama examined the evidence early in 1995 and agreed with Chadrel Rimpoche's conclusion, despite the urging of some in India that he order the Tashilhunpo monks in exile to search for the next Panchen 1ama outside of t¡bet. By early February the da1a¡ 1ama got a message back to Chadrel Rimpoche stating that he had done divination that confirmed Gendun Choekyi Nyima.

This was an important victory for Chadrel Rimpoche and the officials who had urged that Tashilhunpo be permitted to search for the reincarnation in accordance with t¡betan norms and that the da1a¡ 1ama be contacted. It now seemed certain there would be only one Panchen 1ama, found in China as Beijing had initially mandated. All that was left was to work out how to finalize the selection and announce the decision so that neither the da1a¡ 1ama nor Beijing lost face.[8] The selection of the previous Panchen 1ama (which took place over the years from 1941 to 1949) seemed to offer a model for such a compromise.

Relations between the Panchen and da1a¡ Lamas in the early twentieth century were poor, so when the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama levied new taxes on feudal estate holders after his return to Lhasa from India in 1913, the ninth Panchen 1ama refused, arguing that the terms of his land grants (from the Manchu emperor) precluded such additional taxation.[9] The thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama's insistence on payment precipitated the flight of the ninth Panchen 1ama into exile in China together with his top officials in 1924. He died there in 1937.

In keeping with t¡betan tradition, the late Panchen 1ama's officials (those in exile in China) set about to find his incarnation. In 1941 they identified a t¡betan boy in Qinghai province and decided he was the new Panchen 1ama. The da1a¡ 1ama, however, refused to accept the boy found in Qinghai province,
instructing the Panchen 1ama's entourage in China to send him to Lhasa for a final examination that would include two other candidates. When the late Panchen's officials objected, insisting they were positive their boy was the true incarnation, the t¡betan government withheld its final recognition of the Qinghai boy as the new Panchen 1ama.

The Panchen 1ama's officials in China meanwhile had also been seeking formal recognition of their selection from Chiang Kaishek's government, China having claimed ultimate authority over the selection of the Panchen and da1a¡ Lamas since the Qing dynasty.[10] After much deliberation, the Chinese government finally accepted the choice of the late Panchen's officials, in large part to persuade them to flee to Taiwan. On June 3, 1949, while the Nationalists were in the process of withdrawing from the mainland to Taiwan, Li Zongren, the acting president of the Chinese Nationalist government, formally recognized the Qinghai boy—who was then eleven years old[11] —and on August 10, 1949, an enthronement ceremony was held in Kumbum monastery in Qinghai province, attended by the head of the Chinese government's Commission for Mongolian and t¡betan Affairs (on behalf of Li Zongren). There were, of course, no officials from the t¡betan government in Lhasa since they did not accept the legitimacy of either of these actions.[12]

Despite the Nationalist government's recognition, the Panchen 1ama decided to throw in his lot with the Chinese Communists since they seemed more likely to be able to help him return to t¡bet. Thus, as soon as the People's Liberation "liberated" Qinghai province in September 1949, the Panchen 1ama's officials made cordial contacts with them, and on October 1, 1949—the inauguration day of the new People's Republic of China—the Panchen 1ama sent Mao Zedong the following telegram:

For generations the Panchen has been treated most generously and bestowed many honours by the country [China]. For more than twenty years, I have never slackened my efforts to defend the territorial integrity of t¡bet, but nothing has been achieved, for which I feel most guilty. I am now staying in Qinghai, waiting for the order to return to t¡bet. Thanks to the leadership of Your Excellencies, Northwest China has been liberated and the Central People's Government has been established—events that all the people who are proud of the country find highly inspiring. These accomplishments will surely bring happiness to the people and make it possible for the nation to stand on its feet again; and with these accomplishments the liberation of t¡bet is only a matter of time. On behalf of all the t¡betan people, I pay Your Excellencies the highest respects and pledge our wholehearted support.[13]

The following year, Mao Zedong accepted that boy as the tenth Panchen 1ama and agreed to restore his position in t¡bet when it was reunified.[14]

Nevertheless, for most t¡betans, this Panchen 1ama's legitimacy was in question since the da1a¡ 1ama had not accepted him as the true reincarnation. Consequently, when the da1a¡ 1ama's delegation arrived in Beijing in 1951 to negotiate the Seventeen-Point Agreement, China took steps to rectify this by insisting that the t¡betan side recognize the boy before the talks could begin. The t¡betan delegation had no religious authority to make such a judgment and was forced to telegraph the da1a¡ 1ama for instructions. The da1a¡ 1ama quickly performed a holy divination that conveniently confirmed the Qinghai boy as the true tenth Panchen 1ama, and there the matter ended until his death in 1989.

Thus, despite the contested nature of the confirmation process, there was a recent precedent in which the Tashilhunpo monks and officials independently identified a candidate, the Chinese government accepted the boy without resort to a golden urn lottery, and the da1a¡ 1ama subsequently confirmed the choice. However, despite this precedent, the confirmation of the new Panchen 1ama ended in a political debacle.
Since Chadrel had already obtained the da1a¡ 1ama's confirmation of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, it was absolutely essential that he secure China's approval of the boy. His plan apparently was that Beijing would first formally confirm the boy and then the da1a¡ 1ama would indicate that he accepted the choice as correct. In other words, the previous precedent would be followed. Chinese media indicated that on about February 11, 1995, Chadrel Rimpoche sought to persuade the central government to dispense with the golden urn lottery, assuring them that this was in accordance with t¡betan customs and that his own divine lottery conducted before the stupa (religious tomb) of the late Panchen 1ama in Tashilhunpo had determined that Gendun Choekyi Nyima was incontrovertibly the correct incarnation.[15] His efforts, apparently, were unsuccessful because Chinese sources indicate that in March 1995 the government asked Chadrel to submit three to five names for the golden urn drawing.[16] By the middle of the following month, reports indicated that Han and t¡betan officials in China were preparing to assemble for the installation ceremony, although nothing yet had been publicly announced. It was at this juncture that the da1a¡ 1ama suddenly announced to the world on May 14, 1995, that he recognized Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the new Panchen 1ama. His statement asserted that the Chinese government had no authority over this selection by saying, "The search and recognition of Panchen Rimpoche's reincarnation is a religious matter and not political."[17]

The announcement, of course, embarrassed and infuriated the Chinese government. Beijing had tried to do things in a "t¡betan" way through Chadrel Rimpoche and Tashilhunpo monastery, and had even approached the da1a¡ 1ama to help, but now had been humiliatingly upstaged and made to seem irrelevant to the decision-making process. The da1a¡ 1ama had shown the world that from exile he could decide the results of an incarnation search conducted within t¡bet under the auspices of the Chinese government.
Why the da1a¡ 1ama chose to do this, however, is unclear, and neither side has indicated what really happened. The official Chinese version asserts that Chadrel illegally leaked (unspecified) state secrets to the da1a¡ 1ama—Chadrel was sentenced to six years in prison in May 1997 for conspiring to split the nation and for betraying state secrets.[18] But were his contacts with the da1a¡ 1ama really unsanctioned?

Chadrel clearly had state permission to meet Gyalo Thondup in Beijing and send a letter to the da1a¡ 1ama through him, and the da1a¡ 1ama's response, as mentioned earlier, was also "official" in that it was transmitted through the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. Moreover, Chadrel Rimpoche was a patriotic, pro-government 1ama whose political career had been based on opposing splittism and supporting t¡bet as part of China. He was well known in government circles and trusted by the t¡bet Autonomous Region Government (whom Beijing had placed in charge of the search). Consequently, it is unlikely that he decided on his own to interact secretly with the da1a¡ 1ama on a matter of such obvious national importance. On the other hand, it is possible that while top officials in Beijing knew in general about the contacts, it did not know the details, particularly that Chadrel was sending information on all the candidates.

Whichever of the above scenarios is correct, it appears that when Chadrel tried to persuade the central government to dispense with the golden urn lottery, an impasse developed over whether eliminating the golden urn lottery might inadvertently allow the da1a¡ 1ama to claim he had confirmed the candidate before Beijing, and if so, what should be done about this. While the issue was being debated in Beijing, Chadrel—this time certainly without informing anyone in the government—apparently contacted the da1a¡ 1ama and conveyed to him news of the impasse. This information appears to have set in motion discussions in Dharamsala that ended with the da1a¡ 1ama's preemptive announcement.[19]
Hopefully, the full details of this incident will be revealed in the coming years, but for the moment, what is important is its impact on the t¡bet Question. Regardless of what transpired in China and India, the da1a¡ 1ama's decision to preemptively announce the new Panchen 1ama was, to say the least, politically inastute. Even if Beijing ultimately decided to select a different child, the da1a¡ 1ama would have been able to denounce the choice and then specify his own selection. Alternatively, had Beijing ultimately decided to select the right boy, the da1a¡ 1ama could have then given his critical seal of approval, confirming that the correct Panchen 1ama was chosen. Both sides could then have claimed to their followers and the world their representation of what the event "really" meant, but the da1a¡ 1ama would have sent a powerful political signal to Beijing's top leaders that he was genuinely interested in working with them to reduce conflict and overcome problems.

Since the da1a¡ 1ama obviously knew his preemptory announcement would infuriate the Chinese, we must assume that either he actually wanted to show Beijing and the world his paramount role in this issue regardless of the political fallout, or he believed that his unilateral action was necessary to push China to choose the correct boy, the logic being that China would not reject his selection since it was also the choice of Chadrel Rimpoche (and thus Tashilhunpo monastery's own search team).

Whatever the da1a¡ 1ama's motivation, his announcement was seen in China as a hostile political act aimed at embarrassing China and an example of the da1a¡ 1ama's relentless pursuit of political kudos in the West at China's expense. From China's perspective, once again, at a critical time, the da1a¡ 1ama had thumbed his nose at Beijing, sending a clear signal that when it got down to fishing or cutting bait, he still preferred cutting bait!
The da1a¡ 1ama's announcement, of course, placed China in a difficult predicament. Since a basic prerequisite of the entire process was to affirm the Chinese central government's authority to select incarnations, Beijing had to decide whether it should challenge the da1a¡ 1ama's (and, of course, its own search committee's) choice. If it agreed to the da1a¡ 1ama's choice, it could give the appearance that it was merely following his more fundamental authority. However, if it did not and selected someone else, it might have a Panchen 1ama that many (if not most) t¡betans refused to accept as genuine.

It took Beijing five months to come to a decision, but finally it disqualified Gendun Choekyi Nyima and used the golden urn lottery to select a different boy, whom the Chinese government formally confirmed in November 1995. The da1a¡ 1ama and his supporters vociferously attacked this decision, portraying the boy as a false incarnation and charging Beijing with blatant infringement of t¡bet's religious freedom and the da1a¡ 1ama's historic prerogative. Beijing was placed on the defensive on this issue and still is. It now has a prominent incarnate 1ama whom most t¡betans are loathe to accept, and another boy, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, who must be kept under constant surveillance to prevent his being whisked off into exile—an act that would substantially compound the current debacle.
While many in exile and in the West see this as a victory for the da1a¡ 1ama, it is hard to understand their logic. To be sure, it made t¡betans and their Western supporters feel good to see the da1a¡ 1ama exert his authority over this issue, but the price he paid was substantial and the gains were minuscule. In practical terms, the Panchen 1ama he selected is not safe in exile under his tutelage, so he has in effect relegated the boy he chose to a life of house arrest. This creates a powerful human rights issue for the exiles, but only at the cost of further fueling the distrust and animosity that many in China already feel toward him, just at the time when he is under increasing pressure to persuade China to soften its policies in t¡bet. Moreover, his announcement has badly undermined the credibility of the more moderate Chinese officials who sold the State Council on the idea that an ethnically sensitive selection process would be in China's best interests. It has therefore reinforced the hard-liners' contention that China cannot trust or work with the da1a¡ 1ama and set back chances that China will agree to renew talks with him. And it has allowed the "prize"—the new Panchen 1ama—to fall under the control of China. If the da1a¡ 1ama really wanted to play political hardball, it would have made more sense for him to select a Panchen 1ama in exile to be educated and groomed as he saw fit.

But such is the nature of the t¡bet Question. Even when both sides have a common interest in preventing a disaster, emotion and issues of "face"—political pride—easily derail them and marginalize reason. The da1a¡ 1ama knows intellectually that he needs more friends and supporters in Beijing, not Washington or New York City, but he finds it emotionally difficult to take appropriate actions to achieve that end.

In the wake of the Panchen 1ama debacle, Beijing has intensified its propaganda attacks on the da1a¡ 1ama, using a new level of crude and insulting language. This anti-da1a¡ 1ama campaign has continued to the present, and many in China are convinced that waiting until the sixty-two-year-old da1a¡ 1ama dies is the simplest answer to their "t¡bet" problem. At the same time, the Chinese government is proceeding full speed with its policy of developing and modernizing t¡bet. It hopes this policy will solidify its position in t¡bet regardless of what the da1a¡ 1ama or t¡betans think or do, and will ultimately create a new generation of t¡betans who consider it in their interests to be a part of China. If nothing else, this policy will so radically change the demographic composition of t¡bet and the nature of its economy, that failure to win over a new generation of t¡betans will not weaken Beijing's control over t¡bet.
Consequently, from the Chinese side, conditions now are not highly conducive to serious participation in a negotiated solution, let alone dramatic concessions. Beijing's integrationist policy is progressing, its trust of the da1a¡ 1ama is at an all-time low, and the absence of a credible threat of external sanctions from the United States, Europe, and Japan allows them to pursue this with impunity.

On the other hand, the death of Deng Xiaoping in February of 1997 has provided the da1a¡ 1ama a tiny new window of opportunity. It is clear that many experts and moderates in China disagree with the assumptions underlying the current hard-line approach and question whether the current policy will produce the long-term stability in t¡bet that China wants. They realize that it is exacerbating the alienation of t¡betans, even young ones, intensifying their feelings of ethnic hatred and political hopelessness, and inculcating the idea that t¡betans cannot have their nationalistic aspirations met as part of the People's Republic of China. Some latent sentiment remains, therefore, that the long-term interests of China would be best served by returning to a more ethnically sensitive t¡bet policy. Consequently, if a new, stable leadership emerges in Beijing, it might be interested in reviving talks should the proper signals be received from the da1a¡ 1ama. Settling the t¡bet Question would certainly represent a historic victory for any Chinese leader. It is, therefore, not too late for a breakthrough, but the da1a¡ 1ama will have to make the first move. Right now the hard-liners on t¡bet are in control, and they will remain so unless something gives the more moderate elements in Beijing and Lhasa new leverage. That new leverage can only be provided by the da1a¡ 1ama.

jonkwan

Barker

Joined: May 14, 2004
Posts: 127

Status: Offline

Posted: July 12, 2004 - 03:43 PM

yin/yang..you certainly know a lot of t¡bet.
i know that t¡bet, xinjiang and qinghai is strategically important to China because of an important oil transportation route through this areas.
I only learnt about it prior to the news report of the murder of some Chinese in Pakistan

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