chinas social welfare

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FooJay

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Posted: June 27, 2006 - 10:35 PM
Post subject: chinas social welfare

china's social welfare

http://www.proxylord.com/proxy.php?q=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5jaGluYWRldmVsb3BtZ W50YnJpZWYuY29tL25vZGUvMTQ5

Henry_Chinaski
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Posted: June 30, 2006 - 03:03 PM

cant you copy and paste?
thank you.

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Home » Livelihoods
Interview: The state of welfare
Wed, 2003-01-01 13:36
Livelihoods | Social Welfare

In 1998 responsibility for unemployment, medical and other kinds of social insurance was unified under the new Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The reformed system has been put in place very fast; but how comprehensive is it? Are all urban citizens who qualify for benefits actually receiving them, and which social groups are most vulnerable?

ZHANG: Since 1998, China has established a three-tier social protection system that has, in theory, covered the entire urban population: old age and unemployment insurance, financial assistance for laid-off employees, and the guaranteed minimum living allowance scheme1.

One of the biggest achievements of the system in 2002 is that almost all urban residents are covered by either social insurance or social assistance programmes. By the end of the year, more than 19.6 million urban residents were receiving social assistance subsidies under the minimum living allowance programme.

There are many different estimates on how many urban residents are living below the poverty line, but the official estimate is around 20 million. The number of recipients of the minimum living allowance rose from 1.84 million in 1998, to 2.81 million in 1999, 4.02 million in 2000, 11.70 million in 2001 and 19.60 million in 2002, a more than tenfold increase in five years. Central government funding for the scheme has increased from CNY 400 million in 1999 to 800 million in 2000, 2.3 billion in 2001 and 4.6 billion in 2002.

Although central and local governments have made tremendous efforts, still, according to the latest survey of 100 cities by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, around 10% of the minimum living allowance recipients do not get their allowances on time or receive only partial payment.

Social insurance programmes have also increased their coverage among urban residents, and even extended to some migrant labourers in urban areas. By the end of 2001, almost all of the urban working population was covered by old age insurance, more than 95% was covered by unemployment insurance, but only 50% was covered by health insurance and only 40% had some level of maternity benefits. More than 95% of pension and unemployment benefits are paid in full.

But the minimum living allowance is generally quite low, and many recipients do not receive the full amount. For 61.8% of recipients, the monthly allowance is less than CNY 100 (USD 12); for 29.8% it is CNY 100-200, and only 8.4% have a monthly allowance over CNY 200. This can only keep them at survival status.

Of households receiving minimum living allowance subsidies, 33.7% include a disabled person, and 64.9% include a chronically sick person. These are the most vulnerable, especially those in the old industrial cities, or cities in less developed areas.

GUAN: One of the aims of China's social security reform in the 1990s was to turn it into a 'low-level, wide coverage' set-up.

The actual coverage and level of assistance available needs to be analysed in terms of the two different types of benefits available - social security and social assistance (the minimum living allowance system).

To speak first of social security, the reforms of the last decade or so have meant that the all-round level of urban social security system provision has fallen, yet the breadth of coverage has not expanded. The main reason coverage hasn't expanded is that reforms in the enterprise system in the 1990s led to a marked trend towards informalisation in the urban job market, and the number of informally employed urban workers increased greatly. The current system of social security (including old age pensions, health and unemployment insurance) isn't easy for informal workers to take part in.

At the same time, since contributions paid by enterprise employees (the formally employed) are comparatively high and the benefits received are low, not only are many enterprises unenthusiastic about participating, many of their individual employees are also unenthusiastic. Normally, benefits should grow in direct proportion to contributions, but this is not the case here in China at the moment. The main reason is, taking old age insurance for example, that since we operate a 'partial accumulation' model, the requirement is for funds to actually exist in an individual account. So those currently paying their contributions have to provide for the pensions of today's retired people and set aside some money for their own future coverage, meaning that one generation is paying for two generations' pension coverage. If there are no other sources of stable fiscal income, all that can be done to offset the costs of transition is to set high rates for contributions and keep pay-outs low. The large numbers of 'empty accounts' ( ) we've seen over the last few years make it clear that even if the present ratio of fees to benefits is maintained it will still be impossible to guarantee a fiscal balance during the transition period.

Furthermore, turning to medical insurance, since there isn't a great deal of room for raising the rate of contributions, the only recourse is to control outgoings by keeping benefits low. Moreover, since China's health system has to a large degree been commercialised, there are serious contradictions between the need for the insurance system to control contributions and the profit motives of medical institutions. Facing the tripartite 'conspiracy' to increase spending of healthcare - patient demand, together with commercialised health service providers and pharmaceutical companies - the only option for medical insurers is to employ strict control measures such as strict stipulations on minimum payments, maximum benefits, and approved lists of medicines acceptable for reimbursement. This means principally controlling what patient costs get reimbursed, since they are the easiest of the three parties to control.

In this way, there are large reductions in the real benefits seen by patients. If we add to this the generational shift in [the burden of] health insurance (a large part of the health insurance contributions of those currently in work is being spent on care for the retired, the group that makes the greatest demands on funding for care but does not pay towards it), this means that those currently in work are getting very low benefits despite paying high fees for their health care, which naturally affects their enthusiasm as regards paying their contributions.

In regards to the minimum living allowance for urban residents, there has been a great increase in the coverage of the allowance in various cities in recent years as a consequence of the rise in central budgetary allocations, currently more than 20 million nationally [are in receipt of the allowance], approximately 4 or 5 per cent of the urban population.

When a worker is laid off, are his/her social insurance payments maintained, to ensure that s/he is entitled to future benefits - such as a retirement pension? What agency assumes responsibility for these payments?

ZHANG: Yes, the social insurance payments are maintained. The District Bureau of Labour and Social Security will assume responsibility for receiving social insurance payments; however, the worker has to pay both his and his employer's share, but the wage base can vary. For example, suppose the worker wants to continue his social insurance payments, he will go to the District Bureau of Social Insurance and decide a level of base wage. He can take a minimum wage of CNY 400 as the social insurance wage base, and pay his share, supposed to be 6%, and his employer's share, supposed to be 18%; the total is 24% of the CNY 400 - CNY 96 a month - which will be his social insurance payments.

GUAN: Regulations state that once a laid off worker goes to a reemployment centre ( ), the centre should take over the payment of his social insurance contributions. The problem, however, is that not every laid off worker can attend a reemployment centre programme because the circumstances of being 'laid off' ( ) are quite complicated, the reality being that a significant proportion are ineligible to go to such centres. Moreover, a considerable number of those who are accepted by the reemployment centres later find employment in the informal sector, meaning they are no longer able to continue their insurance contributions, effectively leaving them excluded from the ambit of social insurance.

The level of the minimum living allowance is set by local governments. How is it calculated? Is it really enough to meet the needs of recipients? Do governments in poorer areas of China have difficulty raising the necessary money, and does this lead them to set the standard at a low level?

ZHANG: Ideally the minimum living allowance should be based on needs in maintaining a basic living; however, in reality, very few cities have adopted this method. The actual level of the allowance in many cities is based on both local cost of living and the local governments' ability to raise money to cover the programme. Cities within each province can set different levels too.

The biggest challenge is to ensure enough funds to deliver the benefits. While central government has given great support from the general revenue, more than 50% of the funds still come from the local governments. From 2000 to 2002, the central government has increased its funding from CNY 800 million to CNY 4.6 billion, almost a six-fold increase. The local government's funding doubled from CNY 2.96 billion to CNY 5.93 billion. According to the Vice-minister of Civil Affairs, the urban minimum living security programme should stick to the principle 'local government responsibility', so the local government's fundraising capacity will have great impact on the level and delivery of the allowances.

Since the average allowance level is very low, people dependent on the allowances are only able to survive, and their other needs such as health care, children's education etc cannot be met under the current benefit scheme.

GUAN: A unified national standard for living allowance eligibility has not yet been set, nor has a unified method for calculating what that standard should be. The Civil Affairs departments of various cities calculate their local line based on local cost of living. When individual locations set up their system for minimum living allowances, they usually conduct a survey of local residents' real living standards, and then calculate 'minimum living requirements' based on this (usually using a 'shopping basket method'). However, since there is so much flexibility in setting the 'minimum living requirements', it's hard to avoid artificially imposed factors influencing the definition of the minimum living allowance line.

The fact is that in all countries worldwide, the poverty line is set in very close relation to the amount of relief money the government is willing and able to supply. China is no exception. China's urban minimum living allowance was initially paid for by local government. Since the government in many cities and regions is in financial difficulties - or is unwilling to invest a lot of money in relief assistance of this kind - there is a widespread forced depression of the level of the minimum allowance.

Furthermore, even with a line already very low, further requirements concerning 'income due' 2 are included in the means testing of beneficiaries, as well as a whole number of other restrictive regulations, such as the stipulation in many cities that households with a colour television or a telephone cannot be approved to receive the allowance. This means that many people with incomes below the guaranteed minimum level still cannot get relief.

Since 2000, in line with the gradual increase in central budgetary allocation, coupled with repeated instructions from central government to abolish 'income due' regulations, we have finally seen a gradual relaxation in the eligibility restrictions for beneficiaries in the various localities.

There has not, however, been much movement on the level at which the minimum allowance line is set. Because the level was initially set so uniformly low across the various regions, in 2000 it was adjusted to some extent in many places, but only with the prompting and supervision of central government. In 2002, some cities whose lines were set too low made some further readjustments.

The line remains uniformly low. Overall estimates are that the minimum living allowance nationally is set at around 20% to 30% of average urban incomes. Clearly, this is less than the general, international poverty line of 'half (or at least 40%) of average per capita (or median) income'; and in many cities is also lower than the commonly accepted international 'dollar a day' poverty line. Yet the current situation in China means there is little room for the continued upward adjustment of the minimum living allowance line. One of the main reasons for this is that the minimum wage in many of China's cities is so low that if the minimum allowance were raised to any large extent it would approach or even exceed the level of the minimum wage (or actual lowest wages). This would make many people unwilling to work and instead turn their energies to accessing the minimum allowance, placing increased strain on the system. The rural-urban income gap in China is very large, but as large numbers of rural people have come to the cities the polarisation of income levels within urban society has also intensified, creating a large, low-income sector of the urban population. In such circumstances, even a minor rise in the level of assistance would mean that relatively large numbers of additional people would become eligible to receive it.

China's urban minimum living allowance operates on a principle, in theory at least, of 'universal assistance'. This means that if, for whatever reason, a household's income falls below the minimum level, the government has an obligation to provide them with relief. But in reality the government is neither able nor willing to spend large sums of money providing relief to large numbers of people, and thus must control the eligibility of those who apply for such relief. There are two methods available for controlling eligibility. One is to set a relatively high level of minimum guaranteed income but attach many other extra conditions (such as calculating 'income due'); the other is to get rid of such extra conditions, but to maintain a relatively low overall guarantee level. Since the first method leads to all sorts of problems in practice, and stops some genuinely poor people from receiving relief, in the past year or two the local administrations have gradually been abandoning this kind of approach. As other extra conditions are also being progressively abolished, all the government can do is keep the overall level comparatively low or face a sharp rise in applications that budgets will find hard to support.

In reality, all the minimum living allowance can do is provide for the basic living requirements of the poorest. It cannot resolve the problem of the large group of low income earners created by the growing gap in income levels. My personal view is that the biggest problems facing the minimum living allowance system at the moment are improving management and making more effective use of the funds, not the continual raising of the level of the minimum guaranteed allowance or further expansion of its coverage. Expanding coverage when management issues remain unresolved will bring many more new problems. One problems is that from the government's perspective, it will mean the likelihood of misuse or inefficient use of funds; another is that many people on low incomes who in fact do not meet the requirements to receive minimum living allowance will apply for it as a way of increasing their income, in a spirit of 'take it if it's going'; yet another issue is that even those genuinely entitled to minimum allowance could likely come to develop a long term dependence on the system, leading to 'dependence poverty'.

How much local variation is there in the availability and level of benefits? If people move from one province to another, how easy is it for them to transfer their benefits packages?

ZHANG: The current three-tier urban social protection system covers the entire urban population, so the availability of benefits between cities is almost the same, but levels of benefits can vary significantly. The minimum living allowance in Shanghai or Guangzhou can be 100% higher than the standard in Yinchuan or Nanchang. No detailed statistics are yet available yet for the proportion of full delivery, but according to anecdotal reports, the poor areas have lower delivery rates of the full allowance.

Old age pensions can vary too, but not as much as the minimum living allowance.

When people move from one city to another city, once their hukou [residency permit] is transferred, they automatically qualify for the urban minimum living allowance programme. Social insurance accounts can also be transferred, as long as the person has all necessary documents from the original city social security agencies. If the relocation is within one unified social insurance region, only the social insurance account will be transferred, and the actual social insurance funds will remain in the same system. If people move from one unified social insurance region to another, their social insurance account will be transferred to the new city social insurance agency, and all funds in their individual account will be transferred to the new city too.

GUAN: There are differences between different places in both social insurance and minimum living allowance. In terms of social insurance, local differences in the level of coverage are related to differences in wage income; differences in coverage are related to differences in employment rates (especially employment in the formal sector). As for the minimum living allowance, differences in level, coverage and accessibility are related to city and district budgetary levels. As central and provincial level budgetary allocations increase, local differences in the availability of minimum allowance decrease.

As for the transfer issue, there are probably most problems in terms of old age pension. Initially, at the time the system was been devised, thought was given to the problem of transferability. I don't have a detailed understanding of how this has been in actual practice and I find it hard to comment. Transfer of healthcare insurance is not a big problem. After someone moves to a new place all they need do is re-enter the system. Transferability isn't an issue for minimum living allowance.

According to our calculations, urban employers are paying insurance contributions equivalent to about 30% of their wage bill, and employees are contributing about 11% of their wages. Will contributions have to keep increasing?

ZHANG: The social insurance system requires that employers contribute around 30% of their wage bill (including pension, medical, unemployment, injury and maternity). In reality, however, the real contribution rates are much lower. A study done by the World Bank in 1995 found that the real rate was only 55.3% of the contribution rates on paper. Although many efforts have been made to correct this problem, underpayment by both employers and employees is still serious.

In 2001, for instance, the average wage for urban employees was CNY 10,870, and social insurance covered 10.8 million urban employees. The total urban wage bill for social insurance should be CNY 117.4 billion. If we take 41% of this wage bill (30% from employers and 11% from employees), the total contributed to social insurance funds ought to have been at least CNY 48.14 billion. In fact, in 2001, the total social insurance funds were only 30.88 billion, including the subsidies from central and local government. The social insurance funds actually collected were only 64.15% of what they should have been.

One reason for the lower real contribution rate is that the wage base for social security funds is much lower than the real wage bill. Take an example of Zhijiang city in Hubei province. In 2000, the wage base for social insurance funds was CNY 3,756, which is significantly lower than CNY 6,752 — the real wage bill. The social insurance funds collected were only 55.6% of the level they should have been.

A second reason is that 10% of enterprises have still not paid into the social insurance funds, and a study has found that state-owned enterprises are more likely to delay their social insurance payment. In addition, the funds have not been invested well to bring higher returns; most of the funds have only been permitted to be deposited in the bank or used to buy government bonds, and the interest rates are low.

More efforts should be devoted to readjusting the social insurance wage base, compelling enterprises to pay into the funds and studying ways of investing the funds for high returns.

GUAN: According to my own analysis, the possibility of future large rises in employers' or individuals' contributions is small. The main reason is that an excessive level of contributions will have severe effects on the real level of employee's wages, and also affect the competitiveness of enterprises. Most likely is that the current level will be maintained with a gradual reduction of the level of pay outs (For example, lowering the level of pension payments in relation to wages, strengthening the control of redemption of medical costs etc.)

What has happened to the older forms of social protection such as the 'five guarantees' operated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs?

ZHANG: The traditional urban social welfare recipients, such as 'three withouts' ( ) have been incorporated into the current minimum living allowance programme. Since the 1980s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has taken measures to ensure the level and funding for the rural 'five guarantees' too.

Many rural areas have experimented with various forms of community based social security systems that incorporate rural social welfare recipients into community social protection programmes. Starting in 1994, Shanxi province started testing rural minimum living allowance programmes, and in 1996, the first county regulation was made in Guangxi to provide all 'five guarantee' and other poor households with the minimum living allowance. Sixty five per cent of the social assistance funds came from the county general revenue and township revenue funded the remaining 35%. Based on this earlier experience in rural social protection exploration, the Ministry of Civil Affairs started promoting rural social security programmes. By 1999, eleven provinces had established rural minimum living allowance programmes in all county towns, eight provinces had the minimum living allowance programmes in place in over 50% of the county towns, and 3.2 million rural residents had received benefits under the minimum living standard programmes in 2000.

GUAN: The rural 'five guarantees' system has been retained after the reforms, and has adopted the methods of fund pooling and centralised provision. After the 'fees to taxes' ( ) reform in the countryside, it will be necessary to make a new system of provisions for the funding source for the 'five guarantees'.

Those urban residents formerly covered by the 'three withouts' system have now been brought in to the minimum living allowance system.

Other than the above, the welfare services formerly given to 'three withouts' recipients are still in place (such as health care or free residential care for those unable to care for themselves). Attention has been paid to preserving the benefits of this group of society's most vulnerable through the various reforms, with basically no long term ill effects on the effectiveness of the original system

The main social insurance schemes seem to be almost entirely confined to urban populations. What is being done to extend such schemes to rural populations, and what more needs to be done?

ZHANG: In fact, many efforts by both central and local governments have been made in the past 20 years to extend social insurance schemes to the rural population.

In 1986, the Ministry of Civil Affairs introduced community based social security programmes in the rural areas. The principle was that in poor areas, the focus was on social relief and poverty alleviation; in middle income areas, the programmes would focus on full implementation of the 'five guarantees' support system, establishing old age homes, and solving employment problems for the disabled; and in high income areas, social insurance programmes should be established.

However, the community based social insurance schemes failed because their scale was too small, and not transferable between communities. No regulations were made to ensure implementation of the programmes and, more importantly, the social insurance funds mainly came from village or township enterprises. For areas without a strong collective economy, the establishment of community social insurance programmes was problematic, and scale was too small for the funds to be invested for higher returns.

From 1991, the Ministry of Civil Affairs decided to carry out county level social insurance programmes. Individual accounts were established, and subsidies from collective enterprises were only a small portion of the social insurance funds. By the end of 1998, 2123 [ie, nearly all] counties and over 65% of townships had established rural social security programmes, and 80.25 million rural residents were covered by them. Administrative institutions and service networks were established from the central Ministry to the local villages. The rural population supported this scheme.

However, the process was slowed down after rural social security programmes were transferred from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. In the newly established Ministry of Labour and Social Security, there are some disagreements as to whether to proceed with the rural social insurance system, and which forms of programmes should be established. The dominant perspective is that rural areas are still economically under-developed, that efforts should focus on care in the family, and that establishing a rural social security system will put extra burden on both households and government. Rural social insurance coverage declined under the new ministry. By the end of 2001, 59.95 million rural residents were covered, which is a 25% decrease from coverage in 1998.

Because economic development levels vary significantly in rural China, some areas are quite developed and should be encouraged to establish rural social insurance programmes to allow rural residents to catch up with the urban population. Some areas are economically not ready for a social insurance scheme, so emphasis should be placed on establishing minimum living allowance programmes. In general, the government should take a leading role in establishing a flexible rural social protection system.

GUAN: For a long time, the main form of social security system in the countryside was the 'land guarantee' ( ). In the period of a planned economy, the rural collective economy guaranteed the rights of all commune members to share in the allocation of benefits accrued from their labour and the land, and, moreover, set up the system of 'five guarantees', cooperative healthcare and assistance to families in poverty supported by the collective economy. After reform, since land had been reallocated in a fairly even way, and the sale of land was not allowed, farmers could get a relatively stable guaranteed basic livelihood from their land. Despite the marked drop in the returns from land since the 1990s, it remains a stable measure for providing a basic economic guarantee.

The extension of modern social security to the countryside began back in the 1980s. Progress in this respect has, however, been extremely slow for many years, and has never seen a stable or effective system of delivery. At present, parts of the more economically developed areas of the countryside have voluntary old age pension schemes in place (although their operation leaves much to be desired). In the past year or two the government has been looking at the systems for providing cooperative healthcare and minimum living allowance in the countryside, but it is very difficult.

In your view, how long will it be before the whole of China's rural population enjoys the same level of social protection and insurance that urban residents now enjoy? Will the rural areas ever 'catch up?

ZHANG: I like to take a timeline of 15 years to discuss disparities between rural and urban social protection and social insurance benefits. As we know, even urban residents in different localities have different levels of protection and benefits. For the rural areas, I think we can divide the current rural population into several categories in the next 15 years: 25% of the residents will migrate to urban areas and be covered by urban social security programmes; 50% will be covered by county or provincial level rural social security programmes, and the remaining 25% will be covered by the rural guar-anteed minimum living allowance scheme. According to the latest statistics, the rural population accounts for 62.35% of the total population, and the rural labour force accounts for half of the total labour force. The urbanisation process takes two forms. One is rural labourers who migrate to the urban areas to seek jobs and better opportunities. The second is that the government which will allow certain counties to become cities, and these rural residents will become urban residents. Furthermore, reform of the hukou system will mean many rural residents in suburbs will be classified as urban residents. Through this process, more of the rural population will enjoy similar benefits to urban residents, even though they might not have the full benefits right away.

China is in a period of high economic growth, and more and more rural areas will be rich enough to establish county level social insurance programmes, if encouraged and managed well by the government. Considering the rural population base will decrease from 70% to 45% of the total population, the 50% target is not hard to achieve.

For the remaining 25% of rural residents, some forms of social assistance pro-grammes, such as the minimum living allowance scheme, will be established.

GUAN: If we look at this from the current state of economic, political and social development, it is still difficult for the countryside to arrive at the level of social security enjoyed by the urban population. Barring the unexpected, the rural population will one day catch up. How long that will take is hard to say at the moment, perhaps another half century.

Is the difficulty of providing social insurance in rural areas not further deepening the inequality between urban and rural people? Is this likely to postpone the reform or abandoning of the hukou system?

ZHANG: Thehukou system has divided China into two societies. One is the 'urban welfare state' and the other is an under-developed countryside with very limited social protection coverage. But in recent years, reform of the hukou system has been on the agenda for policy makers and lawmakers. The first step is encouraging rural residents to move to small towns. However, many medium and large-sized cities have modified their huko system to allow some rural residents to become urban residents. Many rural residents can obtain urban registration cards and receive social welfare benefits as urban residents.

Policy makers fear that allowing rural residents to become urban residents will increase the burden of social welfare expenditure. However, the experience in Shijiazhuang [which abandoned its hukou requirements in 2001 - ed.] indicates that applications for minimum living allowance benefits have not increased. In addition, if the social insurance programmes are extended to migrants, as those people are mostly young labourers, the pressure on social insurance funds will decrease as more contributions come in.

GUAN: Overall, regardless of whether or not we see the implementation of a modern social security system based on social insurance in the countryside, there is little chance of major negative impact on the rural-urban relationship. Because the fact is that even if such a system is implemented, the money can only come from the rural economy, with little likelihood of budgetary transfers from the government. So whether or what kind of social insurance is implemented in the countryside will have an effect on social equality there, but not on the relationship between the town and the countryside.

Fundamentally, the major factor leading to increasing inequality between town and countryside is the drop in comparative economic effectiveness in the latter, and blocks on rural migration to the cities. The difficulty of implementing social security in the countryside should be seen as a result of rural-urban inequality, not a cause.

Moreover, if government (meaning central or provincial government) were willing to invest more money to set up a rural social security system it would definitely have a positive impact on reducing the rural-urban divide. Considering the limitations on government finances, however, the effect would not be great. For example, in the mid and late 90s the government transferred an average of around CNY 20 billion each year to poor areas, but this did not prevent or slow the widening of the rural urban divide. For some years to come, even if the government invests even more, all they will achieve is provision for the livelihoods of the very poorest in the countryside. It will be hard to have an impact on the overall gap between country and city.

In the coming decades in China, rural development, improvement in rural incomes and rural social security will come mostly from farmers turning themselves into urbanites. The rural economy and income levels there will only show a marked improvement when a large number of the rural population have moved to the towns, and only then will we see the possibility of the establishment and improvement of rural social security.

About the author: Zhang Xiulan is Director of the Social Development and Public Policy Research Centre at Beijing Normal University. Guan Xinping is Professor of Sociology at Tianjin's Nankai University.1 最低生活保证 zuidi shenghuo baozhang, which here we translate throughout as 'guaranteed minimum living allowance' (often contracted to 'minimum living allowance').
For an account of the zuidi shenghuo baozhan system as it first operated, see Sarah Cook's From Iron Rice Bowl to Safety Net in chinabrief (this publication's previous name) Vol. II No 4.

2 This refers to nominal income (such as wages owed by bankrupt state firms) that applicants have not actually received.

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