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tetrahedron
Seeker
Joined: Sep 29, 2004
Posts: 66
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 Posted:
Aug 10, 2007 - 07:24 AM |
 
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| Post subject: The Snow Lion and the Dragon |
t¡bet issue appears a highly charged issue on and out of this forum.
Here is a book by Prof. Melvyn C. Goldstein talking about the historical background and the current conflict over t¡bet. I have read materials from the both sides of the conflict and found this one less biased if you don’t believe there are unbiased views on anything. I am going to post the book here for those who want to read it in several installments. You can also read the book here:
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft2199n7f4/
Two other books I would recommend are “The Dragon in the Land of Snows” by Tsering Shakya, a t¡betan who fled t¡bet at the age of 7 when China was carrying on the “Cultural Revolution” and now a scholar at London University; and “Tian Zang” (Sky Burial) by Wang Lixong. If you can read Chinese and are interested in reading this book, I can send you an electronic copy of the book published in Hongkong if I you pm me your email address. |
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tetrahedron
Seeker
Joined: Sep 29, 2004
Posts: 66
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| Posted:
Aug 10, 2007 - 07:42 AM |
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The Snow Lion and the Dragon
China, t¡bet, and the da1a¡ 1ama
Melvyn C. Goldstein
Preface
The t¡bet Question, the long-standing conflict over the political status of t¡bet in relation to China, is a conflict about nationalism—an emotion-laden debate over whether political units should directly parallel ethnic units. This question pits the right of a "people" (t¡betans) to self-determination and independence against the right of a multiethnic state (the People's Republic of China) to maintain what it sees as its historic territorial integrity.
Such nationalistic conflicts have no easy answers, for the international community has arrived at no consensus about when a people is justified in demanding self-determination or when a multiethnic state has the right to prevent secession. The current United Nations Charter illustrates the ambiguity. Whereas article 1 (section 2) states that the purpose of the UN is to ensure "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination ," article 2 (section 7) states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."[1] Force is often the final arbiter, as when the United States went to war to settle the threat of Confederate secession.[2]
Although t¡bet occupies a remote part of the world, the t¡bet Question has captured the imagination and sympathy of many in America and the West and resonates throughout the American political landscape. It has also become a significant irritant in Sino-American relations. But the conflict is not well understood. Typical of nationalistic conflicts, the struggle to
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control territory has been matched by a struggle to control the representations of history and current events. Both sides (and their foreign supporters) regularly portray events in highly emotional and often disingenuous terms intended to shape international perceptions and win sympathy for their cause. History is a major battlefield, and the facts of the conflict have become obscured by an opaque veneer of political rhetoric. Interested observers are deluged with contradictory claims and countercharges that render a dispassionate and objective assessment of the conflict excruciatingly difficult, even for specialists.
The aim of this book is to peel away the layers of this veneer. In the following pages the anatomy of the t¡bet Question will be examined in a balanced fashion using a realpolitik framework to focus on the strategies of the actors.
While issues such as cultural survival and population transfer will be discussed, this book does not focus specifically on violations of individual human rights in t¡bet, such as abusing prisoners or arresting monks for peaceful political demonstrations. These rights violations exist and are deplorable, but they are not at the heart of the problem. The t¡bet Question existed long before there was a People's Republic of China, and it also predates the recent Western interest in universal human rights. In fact, if there were no human rights violations in t¡bet and if t¡betans could, for example, practice peaceful political dissent, the t¡bet Question would be every bit as contentious as it now is. The t¡bet Question is about control of a territory—about who rules it, who lives there, and who decides what goes on there.
We must also clarify the meaning of "t¡bet." Ethnic t¡betan populations are distributed over an area as vast as Western Europe. They are found not only in China but also in India (Ladakh, Sikkim, northern Uttar Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh), Nepal, and Bhutan. Within China, the 1990 census reported 4.6 million ethnic t¡betans divided between two
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major regions—46 percent in the t¡bet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 54 percent in the west China provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan.[3] The former area—usually referred to as "political t¡bet"—is equivalent to the polity ruled by the da1a¡ Lamas in modern times; the latter—ethnographic t¡bet—corresponds to the borderland areas occupied by various traditional t¡betan native states. Hugh Richardson, the British diplomat who served in Lhasa as an official for the colonial Indian government in the 1930s and 1940s, explained this distinction as follows:
In "political" t¡bet the t¡betan government have ruled continuously from the earliest times down to 1951. The region beyond that to the north and east [Amdo and Kham in t¡betan] . . . is its "ethnographic" extension which people of t¡betan race once inhabited exclusively and where they are still in the majority. In that wider area, "political" t¡bet exercised jurisdiction only in certain places and at irregular intervals; for the most part, local lay or monastic chiefs were in control of districts of varying size. From the 18th century onwards the region was subject to sporadic Chinese infiltration.[4]
This historical differentiation between ethnographic and political t¡bet has become part of the representational battleground of the t¡bet Question. For example, because the t¡betan exile government has as one of its main political goals the reunification of all t¡betan areas in China into a single "Greater t¡bet," it commonly uses the term "t¡bet" to represent events in both ethnographic and political t¡bet, fostering the appearance that "Greater t¡bet" existed in the recent past. Thus, even though political t¡bet was invaded in October 1950, the t¡betan exile government states that t¡bet was invaded in 1949, when Chinese forces "liberated" the ethnographic t¡betan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu provinces.[5] Similarly, to create the impression that t¡bet was part of China in the 1930s and 1940s, the Chinese government states that t¡betan delegates participated in Chinese governmental meetings, implying that they
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were sent from Lhasa, whereas they were actually from ethnographic t¡bet. To avoid such confusion, the term "t¡bet" in this book refers to political t¡bet unless otherwise indicated.
Documenting a book on a contentious topic like modern t¡bet is difficult because much of the key information comes from individuals who request anonymity. Nevertheless, let me broadly describe the sources used in this book.
One important source derives from the Chinese media, e.g., the internal broadcasts included in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations. Another source consists of materials issued by t¡betans in exile (or their supporters), for example, the t¡bet Press Watch of the International Campaign for t¡bet or the World t¡bet News . The reports and documents published by the London-based t¡bet Information Service provided a further source of helpful data and analyses.
In addition to these, my own extensive fieldwork in China provided an important database. Over the past twelve years I have conducted research in t¡bet on a diverse array of topics, including language, nomads, monasteries, modern history, and rural development; I have spent over two full years in residence there. These research stays permitted firsthand observation of urban and rural life, and, since I speak and read t¡betan, I was able to mix easily with t¡betans from all walks of life without the need for guides or translators. Many t¡betans graciously shared their views and opinions with me, and, although their names do not appear in this book, I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to them. Similarly, I owe a great debt to the many officials, scholars, and intellectuals in China, the West, and the t¡betan exile community who also discussed important issues and events with me. Unfortunately, they too must remain nameless. Despite this assistance, in the end responsibility for the views presented in this book are mine and mine alone.
In a different vein, I would be remiss if I did not thank the sponsors of my research—the United States' Committee on
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Scholarly Communication with China, the National Geographic Society's Committee on Research and Exploration, the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities, and the U.S. National Science Foundation. I also owe a great debt to Case Western Reserve University for its generous support of my research endeavors in t¡bet and for facilitating my long relationship with the t¡bet Academy of Social Sciences in Lhasa.
And last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my editors at the University of California Press, Sheila Levine and Laura Driussi. Their support for the project and their skill in expediting the publication of this book have been nothing short of miraculous. |
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tetrahedron
Seeker
Joined: Sep 29, 2004
Posts: 66
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| Posted:
Aug 10, 2007 - 07:49 AM |
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The Imperial Era
Political contact between t¡bet and China began in the seventh century A.D. when t¡bet became unified under the rule of King Songtsen Gampo. The dynasty he created lasted for two centuries and expanded t¡bet's borders to include, in the north, much of today's Xinjiang province; in the west, parts of Ladakh/Kashmir; and in the east, Amdo and Kham—parts of today's Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. Because many of the eastern and northern territories that t¡bet conquered were kingdoms subordinate to China's Tang dynasty (618–907), the Chinese were well aware of the emergence of this powerful kingdom. Songtsen Gampo received a Chinese princess as a bride, and at one point in the eighth century when the Chinese stopped paying tribute to t¡bet, t¡betan forces captured Changan (Xi'an), the capital of the Tang dynasty.[1] By the early ninth century, Sino-t¡betan relations had been formalized through a number of treaties that fixed the border between the two kingdoms.[2] It is clear, therefore, that t¡bet was in no way subordinate to China during the imperial era. Each was a distinct and independent political entity.
During the era of the kings, t¡bet transformed into a more sophisticated civilization, creating a written language based on a north Indian script and introducing Buddhism from India. The first monastery was built not far from Lhasa at Samye in about 779 A.D. The importation of Buddhism, however, produced internal conflict as the adherents of the traditional shamanistic Bon religion strongly opposed its growth and development. Ultimately, this discord led to the disintegration of
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the royal dynasty when the pro-Bon king was assassinated in the middle of the ninth century by a Buddhist monk angry over his persecution of Buddhism.
For the next two hundred years t¡bet languished. The once great empire became a fragmented, disunified collection of autonomous local principalities. Buddhism also paid a heavy price as it was driven out of the central part of t¡bet. Then, in the eleventh century, Indian Buddhist monk-teachers such as Atisha visited t¡bet and sparked a vibrant revival of Buddhism. t¡betan lamas and their disciples constructed new monasteries, and these gradually developed into subsects of t¡betan Buddhism. With no centralized government, the most important of these sects, the Sakya, the Karma Kargyu, and the Drigung Kargyu, became involved in political affairs, supporting powerful lay chiefs and being supported by them in return.
In China, meanwhile, the powerful Tang dynasty collapsed in 905 A.D., and like t¡bet, China experienced a period of disunity (known as the era of the Five Kingdoms, 907–960). During this period a series of buffer states occupied the frontier between China and t¡bet. There is no evidence of political relations between t¡bet and China. Similarly, during the three centuries of the Sung dynasty (960–1279), t¡betan-Chinese political relations were nonexistent. Chinese histories of the period barely mention t¡bet.[3]
All of that changed in the thirteenth century, when a new power rose in the heart of inner Asia.
t¡bet and the Mongols
The unification of the diverse Mongol tribes by Genghis Khan in the late twelfth century led to one of the greatest explosions of conquest the world has ever seen. Mongol armies swept out of the Mongolian plains and mountains and conquered immense spans of territory, including t¡bet, which submitted bloodlessly to the Mongols in 1207. t¡bet paid tribute to
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Genghis Khan, and Mongol forces did not invade t¡bet or interfere in the administration of its principalities.
The death of Genghis Khan in 1227 produced important changes. t¡betans ceased sending tribute to Mongolia and the new supreme khan, Ogedai, ordered a cavalry force under the command of his son Godan into t¡bet. They advanced almost to Lhasa, looting several important monasteries and killing hundreds of monks. During this attack Godan's field commanders collected information on important religious and political leaders, and in 1244, based on their reports, Godan summoned a famous 1ama of the Sakya sect—Sakya Pandita—to his court in what is now Gansu. The Sakya 1ama arrived in 1247 and made a full submission of t¡bet to the rule of the Mongols. He also gave religious instruction to Godan and his officials, and in turn was placed in charge of t¡bet as viceregent. Sakya Pandita sent a long letter back to t¡bet telling his countrymen that it was futile to resist the Mongols and instructing them to pay the required tribute. It also said, according to t¡betan sources:
The Prince has told me that if we t¡betans help the Mongols in matters of religion, they in turn will support us in temporal matters. In this way, we will be able to spread our religion far and wide. The Prince is just beginning to learn to understand our religion. If I stay longer, I am certain I can spread the faith of the Buddha beyond t¡bet and, thus, help my country. The Prince has allowed me to preach my religion without fear and has offered me all that I need. He tells me that it is in his hands to do good for t¡bet and that it is in mine to do good for him.[4]
Thus began the curious relationship t¡betans refer to as "priest-patron" (in t¡betan, mchod yon ). t¡bet's 1ama provided religious instruction; performed rites, divination, and astrology; and offered the khan flattering religious titles like "protector of religion" or "religious king." The khan, in turn, protected and advanced the interests of the "priest" ("1ama"). The lamas also made effective regents through whom the Mongols ruled t¡bet.
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Godan was succeeded by one of the greatest of the Mongol rulers, Kublai Khan. He became the supreme khan of all the Mongols in 1260 and went on to conquer China in 1279, founding the Yuan dynasty. Sakya Pandita, in the meantime, was succeeded by his nephew, Phagpa, who developed a privileged relationship with the extraordinarily powerful khan. Kublai became a great patron of Buddhism in general and of the Sakya sect in particular, making Phagpa his imperial tutor as well as the ruler of t¡bet under his authority. The relationship between Kublai and Phagpa, however, was complex. In keeping with the "priest-patron" ideology, Phagpa was much more than a conquered subject put on the throne. An amazing disagreement between the two, documented in both t¡betan and Mongolian records, illustrates the great stature that t¡bet's lamas held among the Mongols. When Kublai asked Phagpa to serve as his spiritual tutor, Phagpa agreed but insisted that Kublai show deference to his superior religious stature. Kublai initially refused, but eventually relented and agreed to sit on a throne lower than the 1ama when he was receiving private instruction, as long as the 1ama sat lower in all other settings.[5]
Contemporary Chinese scholars and officials consider this the period when t¡bet first became part of China. Nationalistic t¡betans, by contrast, accept only that they, like China, were subjugated by the Mongols and incorporated into a Mongol empire centered in China.
The Sakya ruled in t¡bet for roughly a century, until they were overthrown in 1358 by one of their governors. The Yuan dynasty was too weak to do anything but quietly accept this turn of events. In fact, just ten years later the Yuan dynasty itself was overthrown and replaced by an ethnically Chinese dynasty known as the Ming. Relations between t¡bet and China continued during the Ming dynasty, but unlike their Yuan predecessors, the Ming emperors (1368–1644) exerted no administrative authority over the area. Many titles were given to leading t¡betans by the Ming emperors, but not to confer authority as
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with the Mongols. By conferring titles on t¡betans already in power, the Ming emperors merely recognized political reality.[6]
Then, in the seventeenth century, political events in t¡bet and China saw the rise of two new powers.
The Rise of the Geluk Sect in t¡bet
When t¡bet was subjugated by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, the Geluk, or Yellow Hat, sect of the da1a¡ 1ama had not yet come into existence. t¡bet was dominated by several "Red Hat" Buddhist sects such as the Sakya and Kargyu. The emergence of what was later to become t¡bet's greatest sect occurred only in the late fourteenth century, when a brilliant Amdo monk named Tsongkapa came to central t¡bet in 1372 to seek teachings from all the great lamas of the day. A charismatic figure, he found an appalling state of moral decline in central t¡bet, particularly in regard to the vow of celibacy, and he began to preach a reformist doctrine that emphasized strict monastic vows of celibacy, and scholastic study as the path for enlightenment. This marked the beginning of the Geluk, which in t¡betan means, "the system of virtue."
In 1408 Tsongkapa began the custom of convening a month-long Great Prayer Festival in the heart of Lhasa, and in 1409 he founded his own monastery—Ganden—on a ridge about twenty-seven miles east of Lhasa. As he began to write and teach, he attracted a circle of devoted disciples who spread his ideas, creating a new and vibrant Buddhist sect. To differentiate themselves from the earlier sects, the followers of Tsongkapa took to wearing yellow instead of red hats and thus have come to be known as the Yellow Hat sect. Within a short time Tsongkapa's disciples built what were to become the Geluk sect's two largest monasteries—Drepung (in 1416) and Sera (in 1419). Located just outside of Lhasa, those two monasteries became small monk-towns, housing over fifteen thousand monks by 1950. Another of Tsongkapa's famous disciples,
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Gendundrup, extended the influence of the Geluk sect into southwest t¡bet (Tsang) when he built the famous Tashilhunpo monastery near the town of Shigatse in 1445.
As these followers of Tsongkapa gained support among the aristocracy and their sect grew in size and importance, they engendered the suspicion and hostility of the more powerful established sects like the Karma Kargyu who were closely allied with the rulers of political t¡bet, the princes of Rimpung (and following them, the Tsangpa kings). The fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, in fact, were characterized by extensive civil and religious strife in t¡bet, the Yellow Hat monks coming into recurring conflict with the Karma Kargyu and their political supporters. In 1498, for example, the Rimpung king actually forbade the Yellow Hat monks of Sera and Drepung from participating in the Great Prayer Festival begun by Tsongkapa, limiting the prayer festival to monks of the Kargyu and Sakya sects. By the early seventeenth century the sectarian conflict had worsened. In a dispute between the Geluks and the pro-Karma sect Tsangpa king, the king's troops in 1618 killed a large number of Geluk monks, occupied Sera and Drepung monasteries, and prohibited a search for the incarnation of the fourth da1a¡ 1ama, who had recently died. The Geluk retaliated in 1633, attacking and defeating the Tsangpa king's troop garrisons around Lhasa with the help of several thousand Mongol followers. A peace agreement was negotiated, but Mongols were again playing a significant role in t¡betan internal affairs, this time as the military arm of the da1a¡ 1ama, the main incarnate 1ama of the Geluk sect.
The idea of reincarnation as a method of religious succession was developed by the Karma Kargyu sect in 1193, hundreds of years before the Yellow Hat sect emerged on the scene. The idea derives from the Buddhist belief that all humans are trapped in an endless sequence of birth, death, and rebirth until they achieve nirvana (enlightenment). In the Mahayana
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school of Buddhism (into which t¡betan Buddhism is subsumed), some enlightened beings (bodhisattvas ) defer their final release from the cycle of birth and rebirth—nirvana—and return to human form to help the remaining sentient beings progress toward enlightenment.
In the late twelfth century the great Karma 1ama Düsum Khyempa used this concept to prophesy his own rebirth; and soon after he died, his disciples discovered a child into whom they believed he had emanated. That child was considered to be Düsum Khyempa in a new body, so the charismatic authority and stature of the old master 1ama were now inherent in the child. In a world where religious sects constantly competed for lay patrons, the religious and political benefits of this form of rebirth were striking, and it quickly became a general part of the t¡betan religious landscape. Incarnate lamas developed lineages, which functioned like corporations in the sense that they came to own property and peasants and retain a legal identity across generations. New incarnations of the initial great 1ama formed an unbroken line of succession. As long as everyone accepted the validity of the discovery process, the powerful charisma of a holy 1ama could be routinized and the focus of devotion and support continued. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Yellow Hat sect also adopted this tradition when one of their most important religious leaders, Gendundrup (the founder of Tashilhunpo monastery) died in 1474. His disciples searched for and discovered his reincarnation in the body of Gendun Gyatso, a young boy who became the second in the new incarnation lineage. When Gendun Gyatso died in 1543, his consciousness emanated into the body of another boy, Sonam Gyatso, who became the third in that line of lamas.
Sonam Gyatso was an energetic proponent of the Yellow Hat sect's ideology with strong missionary tendencies. His fame reached the ears of a powerful Mongol ruler called Altyn
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Khan who invited Sonam Gyatso to visit him. In 1578 they met in today's Qinghai province (Amdo). Sonam Gyatso impressed the khan with his spirituality and religious power, and they exchanged honorific titles in the manner of the time. The 1ama enhanced the stature of the khan in relation to other Mongol chiefs by giving him the title "king of religion, majestic purity," and the khan gave Sonam Gyatso the Mongolian title of da1a¡ , "ocean" in Mongolian, the implication being that his knowledge or spirituality was as vast as the ocean. Thus was born the title da1a¡ 1ama. Sonam Gyatso was the first to hold the title, but since he was the third incarnation in the Yellow Hat sect's incarnation line, he came to be known as the third da1a¡ 1ama, with the titles of first and second da1a¡ 1ama given posthumously to his two predecessors.
Sonam Gyatso solidified his relationship with the Mongols by spending the remaining ten years of his life in Mongolia and the nearby Kham and Amdo regions, giving teachings and making important inroads for the Yellow Hat sect. Much of this success was at the expense of the older Karma Kargyu and the pre-Buddhist Bon sects. When he died in 1588, the Geluk-Mongol tie was intensified as his reincarnation, the fourth da1a¡ 1ama, was discovered in Mongolia in the body of the great-grandson of none other than Altyn Khan. The fourth da1a¡ 1ama was taken to Lhasa in 1601 accompanied by an entourage of Yellow Hat lamas and nobles who had traveled to Mongolia for this purpose. They were escorted by a contingent of armed Mongol followers. The new Yellow Hat sect, therefore, came to be closely associated with the Mongols. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this close religious/political relationship became a critical component of Sino-t¡betan relations.
The Mongolian fourth da1a¡ 1ama died in 1616 and was succeeded by the fifth da1a¡ 1ama who was discovered in central t¡bet, not far from Lhasa. Sectarian strife intensified in his youth, when an ally of the Tsangpa king started to persecute
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Geluk monks and institutions in Kham and talked of moving into central t¡bet to attack the Geluk sect's main centers. The Geluk feared this was the beginning of a concerted effort to wipe out their sect and turned for help to their Mongol adherents in the person of Gushri Khan.
Gushri Khan was the chief of the Qoshot tribe, a branch of the Western Mongols who were based in Dzungaria, in present-day northeast Xinjiang. As a follower of the da1a¡ 1ama he answered his 1ama's call for help and between 1637 and 1640 defeated the anti-Geluk forces in Amdo and Kham, resettling his whole tribe in the process in Amdo. Then, at the request of Sonam Chöpel, the chief steward (administrator) of the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, Gushri marched into t¡bet where he attacked the Tsangpa king himself at his home base in Shigatse. The Geluk sect sent its own force of supporters and monks to assist him, and in 1642 they captured Shigatse. The king of t¡bet (the Tsangpa king) was executed.
Gushri Khan gave supreme authority over all of t¡bet to the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, appointing the da1a¡ 1ama's chief steward, Sonam Chöpel, as regent to carry out the day-to-day affairs of state. The main rival of the Yellow Hat sect, the Karma Kargyu, bore the brunt of the defeat and were actively persecuted by the Geluk government. Much of their wealth and property was confiscated and many of their monasteries were forcibly converted to the Geluk sect. The Yellow Hat sect therefore quickly eclipsed all the others in size, strength, and wealth.
Using foreign troops to seize power in one's country is dangerous; it is easier to persuade them to come than induce them to go. This is what happened in t¡bet. Gushri Khan did not pick up his troops and return to Amdo after winning t¡bet for his 1ama. Instead he took the title of king of t¡bet for himself and his descendants and remained in Central t¡bet, spending his summers in a pasture area north of Lhasa and his winters in Lhasa. The military power behind the new
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Yellow Hat government remained in his hands. The da1a¡ 1ama and a regent administered the country, but it appears clear that they had to defer to his views to some degree.
At the time the Geluk sect was unifying t¡bet under its rule, another group with central Asian origins, the Manchu, were in the final stages of conquering China. In 1644 they established a new dynasty, the Qing, which lasted until 1911. The Geluk sect and the Manchu had only cursory contact before they both came to power, but afterward, the Qing emperor invited the fifth da1a¡ 1ama to visit Beijing and he agreed, arriving there in 1656. The Qing emperor treated the da1a¡ 1ama with great courtesy and respect. There was nothing in this meeting to indicate political subordination on the part of the t¡betan prelate. With his Qoshot Mongol army behind him and his broad following among other Mongol tribes, some of whom were a threat to the Qing themselves, the da1a¡ 1ama was not someone to be trifled with.
Stability in t¡bet continued until the fifth da1a¡ 1ama died in 1682. Then the weakness of reincarnation succession started a process of decline. Since the deceased 1ama can emanate only into someone born after his death, there is inevitably a period of fifteen to twenty years when the new incarnation-ruler is a minor, and a period of potential instability as others try to rule in his name. Sangye Gyatso, t¡bet's regent at the death of the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, dealt with this "crisis" by hiding the death from the nation. Whether motivated by fear that his position was in jeopardy or that general disturbances might arise, he pretended that the da1a¡ 1ama had withdrawn for extended meditation and could not be disturbed. He maintained this hoax for fourteen years, ruling in the fifth da1a¡ 1ama's name until 1696 when the secret became public.
During this period, the regent also intrigued with the powerful Dzungar Mongols, whose chief, Ganden, had been a monk at the main Geluk monasteries in Lhasa. It appears that the t¡betan regent encouraged the Dzungars (in the da1a¡ 1ama's name) to
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unify all Mongols under their rule. When the Dzungars attacked the Eastern (Khalkha) Mongols and won a major victory in 1682, a new unified Mongolia seemed again possible.
One can only surmise that the regent wanted to use the might of the Dzungars to offset the military power of the Qoshot Mongols in t¡bet, perhaps even to force them out of t¡bet and back to Amdo. He may also have felt that the power and prestige of the da1a¡ Lamas would be greatly enhanced in a Mongolia united under the Dzungars, who looked to him as their main 1ama. But the regent was playing a high-risk game: the Dzungars were the last group strong enough to challenge the supremacy of the Qing dynasty, so siding with them meant opposing the interests of the Qing.
The Dzungar attempt to unify all Mongols, however, failed. The defeated Eastern Mongols sought the protection of the Qing emperor, who accepted their submission and, thinking that the Dzungar's spiritual leader, the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, was still alive, asked that he use his religious authority to persuade the Dzungars to stop their invasion. Without informing the Qing emperor that the da1a¡ 1ama was dead, the t¡betan regent sent a 1ama emissary to the Dzungars ostensibly to persuade them to desist in their invasion, but he appears to have conducted rites to ensure their victory. The Dzungars continued moving south toward Inner Mongolia. At this point the Qing emperor sent a large army against them and in 1696 won a major victory at the Kalulun River in Mongolia. Ganden committed suicide. The Dzungar's threat to the Qing dynasty was over, but a dangerous message had been sent to the Qing emperor regarding the importance of t¡bet's lamas and the political untrustworthiness of the t¡betan regent.
Almost immediately, the Qing found an opportunity to meddle in t¡betan affairs. When Lhabsang Khan, Gushri Khan's grandson, assumed the title of king of t¡bet in 1697, he set out to restore the political authority that his grandfather Gushri Khan had wielded. This placed him in direct conflict with the
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t¡betan regent, who wanted no Mongol influence in his administration.
A bone of contention for Lhabsang Khan was the behavior of Tsayang Gyatso, the sixth da1a¡ 1ama. This boy had been secretly identified as the new da1a¡ 1ama soon after the death of the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, but because the regent was keeping the fifth's death a secret, he announced only that this child was the incarnation of another 1ama. Thus, Tsayang Gyatso was not enthroned as the sixth da1a¡ 1ama until 1697 when the news of the fifth's death became public.
The sixth da1a¡ 1ama, however, turned out to be totally deviant in attitude and values, refusing to play the role of a celibate religious practitioner. He renounced his monastic vows and became a famous libertine, writing love poems and carousing with women at night in Lhasa. Lhabsang Khan was among those who believed that the regent was remiss in not insisting the da1a¡ 1ama act like a true 1ama. Whether this demand was based on sincere conviction or simply a means to attack the regent is unclear. However, relations between the regent and Lhabsang Khan steadily worsened until 1705 when Lhabsang, supported by the Qing emperor and allied with a number of aristocratic t¡betan families, attacked the regent in Lhasa, defeating his forces. The regent was executed and Lhabsang Khan become the king of t¡bet in fact as well as in title.
The emperor of China sent an envoy to Lhasa and recognized the khan as ruler of t¡bet under his protection. The khan, in turn, agreed to make regular tribute payments to the Qing in return for their support. Thus Lhabsang Khan placed himself and the t¡bet he now ruled in a subordinate relationship to the Qing dynasty. Lhabsang Khan also publicly announced that Tsayang Gyatso was not the true sixth da1a¡ 1ama, and with the approval of the Qing emperor, sent him to exile in Beijing, foisting off another monk of the appropriate age as the person who should have been recognized years earlier as the real sixth t¡betan prelate. Lhabsang's military control of t¡bet
― 13 ―
enabled him to impose his will, but it angered the monks and populace, who continued to consider Tsayang Gyatso as the true sixth da1a¡ 1ama. When Tsayang Gyatso died en route to Beijing, rumors quickly arose in t¡bet that he had emanated into a new body in Litang (in Kham) in accordance with a hauntingly beautiful poem he had written before his death that said,
Lend me your wings, white crane;
I go no farther than Litang, and thence return again.[7]
As displeasure with the situation in Lhasa rose, the monks of the three great Geluk monasteries around Lhasa turned to the Geluk's Mongol followers, the Dzungars, for aid in overthrowing Lhabsang Khan and his false da1a¡ 1ama and installing the boy from Litang as the seventh da1a¡ 1ama.
In 1717 seven thousand Dzungar cavalrymen entered t¡bet and, with the aid of a number of t¡betan monks and laymen, quickly defeated Lhabsang Khan, who was killed in the fighting. The Dzungars appointed a new t¡betan regent, deposed the "false" sixth da1a¡ 1ama installed by Lhabsang, arrested and executed a number of aristocrats and lamas who had been close supporters of Lhabsang Khan, and became the new rulers of t¡bet. However, the Mongols soon alienated t¡betans by engaging in looting and by executing some Red Hat lamas. And critically, they failed to bring the new seventh da1a¡ 1ama from Amdo to t¡bet, as they had promised. The Qing emperor and his allies, understanding the political importance of the da1a¡ 1ama, beat the Dzungars to the punch and placed the Litang boy under their control. Opposition to the Dzungar presence grew quickly in Lhasa.
In the meantime, two important t¡betan aristocrats—Pholhanas and Khangchennas—began to organize forces in west and southwest t¡bet to oppose the Dzungars, and the Qing emperor, Kangxi, sent an army into t¡bet in response to a plea for help dispatched by Lhabsang Khan before his defeat.
― 14 ―
When this Qing army was annihilated by the Dzungars, most court officials in Beijing were opposed to further military operations in t¡bet, but the emperor saw t¡bet as an important buffer for western China (Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan) and was unwilling to allow it to remain in the control of his enemy, the Dzungars.[8] Consequently, he ordered a second, larger army into t¡bet, sending the young seventh da1a¡ 1ama with them. As the Qing troops entered t¡bet from Amdo and Kham, the t¡betan forces of Pholhanas and Khangchennas also moved on Lhasa from the southwest. This time the Dzungars were defeated, and in October 1720 the Qing army entered Lhasa with the new seventh da1a¡ 1ama. Qing troops now controlled Lhasa and t¡bet.
The Qing emperor was not interested in administratively absorbing t¡bet into China. His goal was to control the actions of t¡bet's fractious leaders, and particularly to prevent its lamas from using their religious sway over the Mongols to harm Qing interests. In the past the Qing had tried to win the friendship and allegiance of high t¡betan lamas like the da1a¡ 1ama through titles and gifts, but that approach had proved insufficient. Now the Qing decided to create a kind of loose protectorate over t¡bet to enforce its dynastic interests. The powerful Qing dynasty would protect t¡bet from external and internal conflict, leaving t¡betan leaders it approved of to rule t¡bet in a manner that was not inimical to Qing interests. The structuring of this passive hegemony took the Qing the rest of the eighteenth century and forced them to send armies into t¡bet on three more occasions.
The Qing made a number of important changes in the administration of t¡bet. They installed the fifteen-year-old Litang boy in the pοta⌊a Palace as the seventh da1a¡ 1ama and arrested and executed the main pro-Dzungar officials, including the t¡betan regent the Dzungars had appointed. The Qing solidified their new dominance in t¡bet by building a military garrison in Lhasa and staffing it with several thousand troops.
― 15 ―
They also eliminated the office of regent (initiated by the Qoshot Mongols in 1642), replacing it in 1721 with collective rule by four ministers (kalön ), one of whom, Khangchennas, was appointed chairman. All four ministers were important lay t¡betan officials who had supported Lhabsang Khan and opposed the Dzungar's invasion.
Father I. Desideri, a Jesuit priest living in Lhasa at this time, prophetically wrote of this event: "After nigh twenty years of tumult and disaster this . . . t¡bet . . . was thus subjugated by the emperor of China in October, 1720, and here his descendants will probably continue to reign for many centuries."[9] The religious conflict between the Geluk and Karma Kargyu sects had therefore brought t¡bet under the control first of the Qoshot Mongols, then of the Dzungar Mongols, and finally of the Qing dynasty. The latter would remain the overlords of t¡bet until they fell from power in China in 1911.
The 1720 Qing administrative reforms did not go well. The strategy of replacing a single all-powerful regent with a number of ministers created bitter dissension rather than a stable balance of power. In 1727 civil war erupted when three ministers assassinated the chief minister Khangchennas and tried to kill Pholhanas, a minister who supported him. Pholhanas, however, escaped the assassination plot and raised an army in southwest and west t¡bet, his home area. He moved on Lhasa and defeated the other ministers, taking control of the city in July 1728.
No Qing troops were present to restore order in Lhasa because the emperor had withdrawn his garrison in 1722 after t¡bet's ministers complained that it was difficult to feed several thousand troops from what was basically a feudal subsistence economy. Consequently, when he learned of the coup attempt in t¡bet, the Qing emperor had to dispatch another imperial army to Lhasa (the third in a decade). This force arrived two months after Pholhanas had taken the city. With the situation calm and the ministers responsible for the coup under
― 16 ―
Pholhanas's control, the Qing commander and Pholhanas jointly formed a judicial board that ordered the execution of the three ministers and their families as well as a number of other officials and lamas involved. New ministers were appointed, but Pholhanas, now clearly the dominant figure, was confirmed as the chief administrator of t¡bet. The twenty-two-year-old seventh da1a¡ 1ama, however, experienced a different fate. He was sent into exile in Kham, together with his father, who had apparently intrigued with the fallen ministers as well as with the Dzungars.
Administratively, the Qing imposed reforms they hoped would stabilize the situation in t¡bet. To ensure law and order, the Qing military garrison was reestablished in Lhasa with two thousand troops. A supporting garrison of one thousand troops was set up in Chamdo, in eastern t¡bet, to facilitate the deployment of reinforcements. Additionally, the emperor now decided to station two Manchu imperial residents (known as amban ) in Lhasa with orders to keep a close watch on the leaders of t¡bet and oversee the garrison in Lhasa.[10] The practice of having Qing ambans in Lhasa continued until 1912.
The Qing also weakened t¡bet by substantially reducing its territories in the border area between t¡bet and China. In 1728 three large ethnic t¡betan areas in Kham were placed under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and three others under the jurisdiction of Yunnan province.[11] Amdo or Kokonor had already been placed under the jurisdiction of Xining in 1724 after a revolt by the Mongol khans ruling there. The emperor tried to further fragment t¡bet in 1728 by offering the Yellow Hat sect's second greatest incarnation, the Panchen 1ama, administrative control over all of southwest (Tsang) and western t¡bet. The Panchen 1ama refused this offer, but ultimately accepted control over three large districts in Tsang. The Lhasa government, therefore, now ruled a substantially scaled-down political entity.
The reforms of 1728 were effective, and for the next nineteen years t¡bet was internally peaceful. Pholhanas was a strong
― 17 ―
and capable administrator who was able to operate a well-run and stable government while skillfully gaining the confidence of the ambans and the Qing emperor. He quickly persuaded Beijing to reduce the garrison in Lhasa to five hundred troops, and in 1735 brought the seventh da1a¡ 1ama back from exile, although excluding him from any involvement in the administration of t¡bet. The da1a¡ 1ama was now nothing more than a spiritual figurehead. In 1739 Pholhanas was given the title of prince by the Qing emperor, becoming, in essence, the king of t¡bet. The two ambans remained in Lhasa but had little to do with everyday administration; Pholhanas determined the course of t¡betan events. As one Chinese historian notes, Pholhanas "made all the decisions in t¡bet, the amban being consulted merely regarding their implementation."[12]
When Pholhanas died in 1747, his son Gyurme Namgye inherited his title of prince. One hundred years after unification under the fifth da1a¡ 1ama, t¡bet was now ruled not by da1a¡ Lamas but by a lay aristocratic family as a Qing dependency. Gyurme Namgye's attitude toward the Qing was very different from his father's. Pholhanas had skillfully managed Sino-t¡betan relations by carefully exuding an attitude of friendship and loyalty to the Qing, securing in return the freedom to rule t¡bet in accordance with its native customs and values. His son, on the other hand, sought to rid t¡bet of all vestiges of Qing overlordship. He complained to the emperor Qian Long that Qing troops need not be stationed in t¡bet and that the emperor's imperial commissioners, the ambans , were interfering in his administration and exploiting the people. Since t¡bet had been peaceful and unproblematic for the previous two and a half decades, the emperor agreed to reduce the Lhasa garrison to a token one hundred troops and instructed the ambans in Lhasa not to interfere in t¡bet's administration. He also agreed to send additional funds to cover the expenses of the ambans and troops, thus reducing the need for corvees (that is, taxation in the form of forced labor) to obtain goods and
― 18 ―
services. But Gyurme Namgye wanted all troops and ambans out of t¡bet. He began to organize a secret t¡betan army of his own and, disastrously, began to intrigue with the habitual enemies of the Qing dynasty, the Dzungar Mongols.
When the ambans in Lhasa learned of these machinations, they invited him to their residence in Lhasa and murdered him. In response, Gyurme Namgye's followers attacked the ambans ' residence and killed them together with their troops. Another several hundred Chinese sought refuge in the pοta⌊a under the protection of the seventh da1a¡ 1ama and were spared. The Qing emperor, Qian Long, ordered an army to march to t¡bet.
Into this political void, the seventh da1a¡ 1ama intervened. He stopped the rioting and killing of Chinese and Manchu, appointed a lay aristocrat to operate the government, and had the leaders of the riot captured. Consequently, by the time the Qing emperor's troops reached Lhasa order had been restored under the authority of the da1a¡ 1ama. The Qing commander publicly executed a number of Gyurme Namgye's supporters, and, as in 1723 and 1728, made changes in the political structure, this time drawing up a formal reorganization plan to permanently stabilize t¡betan politics called the "Thirteen Article Ordinance for the More Efficient Governing of t¡bet." Having tried to control t¡bet through a lay aristocratic family, the Qing now restored the da1a¡ 1ama as ruler but elevated the role of the amban to include more direct involvement in t¡betan internal affairs. At the same time the Qing took steps to counterbalance the power of the aristocracy by adding officials recruited from the clergy to key posts. For example, a monk minister was added to the new council of ministers, and from this time the abbots and the chief managers (chiso ) of the three great Geluk monasteries around Lhasa (Drepung, Sera, and Ganden) took part in discussions with the council ministers on important affairs.[13]
For several decades, peace reigned in t¡bet, but the country was weak and disunited. When a dispute between t¡bet
― 19 ―
and Nepal precipitated a Nepalese invasion in 1788, the t¡betans could not defend their country. The Nepalese looted Tashilhunpo, the monastery of the Panchen 1ama, and occupied a substantial portion of southwest t¡bet. The Qing emperor sent a large Chinese army into t¡bet that joined t¡betan forces in 1792 to push the Nepalese out and force them to sue for peace. It was the fifth army the Qing had sent to t¡bet in the eighteenth century.
The inability of the t¡betans to expel the Nepalese forces without an army from China, coupled with charges of poor leadership and organization in the t¡betan government, prompted yet another Qing reorganization of the t¡betan government, this time through a written plan called the "Twenty-Nine Regulations for Better Government in t¡bet." This reform package included the selection of top incarnations (hutuktus ) like the da1a¡ and Panchen Lamas through a lottery conducted in a golden urn, the aim being to prevent the selection of incarnations being manipulated to fall in politically powerful lay families.[14] It also elevated the ambans to equal political authority with the da1a¡ 1ama for major administrative issues and appointments and mandated that nominations for top positions like council minister be submitted to the emperor for approval. The reforms also included regulations forbidding exploitation of peasants through the misuse of corvee labor, and prohibited the relatives of the da1a¡ and Panchen Lamas from holding public office during the lamas' lifetimes. Qing military garrisons staffed with Qing troops, moreover, were now established near the Nepalese border at Shigatse and Dingri.[15]
The Qing rationale for these changes was conveyed by Fu Kangan, the general in charge of the expeditionary force, in comments to the da1a¡ 1ama at that time:
The administration of t¡betan local affairs has never had any system to go by. All the da1a¡ 1ama does is silent meditation and is therefore not well-informed of events taking place outside. The kaloons [council ministers] cheat with wild abandon in
― 20 ―
times of peace, and in times of war they are not able to do anything [in] defense. Extensive regulations are needed so that everyone knows what he is expected to do. In this regard His Majesty has instructed me in great detail what to do and has ordered me and the others to deliberate on his instructions to make sure that their execution will serve the interests of the t¡betans for a long time to come without creating any drawbacks. Since the da1a¡ 1ama is grateful to His Majesty for what he has done for t¡bet, he is expected to respect the changes to be made for better government in t¡bet. If he persists in his old ways of doing things, His Majesty will call back the resident officials and evacuate the t¡betan garrison immediately after the withdrawal of the expeditionary army, and the Court will not come to the help of t¡bet should any emergencies arise in the future. The da1a¡ 1ama is asked to weigh the pros and cons and make up him [sic] mind.[16]
Fu Kangan's comments reveal Beijing's frustration with the leaders of its t¡bet dependency. Beijing had sought a peaceful t¡bet that caused it no problems, but had already found it necessary to send five armies there in less than seven decades. The da1a¡ 1ama agreed to the regulations and gave assurances that his ministers would do so as well.
In the years immediately following the 1792 regulations, the ambans exercised their greatest authority, but they made no attempt to absorb t¡bet into China as a province. t¡bet maintained its own language, officials, and legal system, and paid no taxes or tribute to China. In fact, the 1792 reforms included the creation of t¡bet's first standing army, the emperor's aim being to enable t¡bet to defend itself and thus avoid having to send troops again. In modern times the popular name of this regiment was "Chinese trained" (or Gyajong ).
The actual role of the amban in t¡bet is difficult to assess. Despite the rhetoric and rules the Qing prepared, their power appears to have varied considerably in accordance with many factors such as their personality and competence in relation to that of the leaders of t¡bet, and the nature of the political situ-
― 21 ―
ation in China and t¡bet at any point in time. A comment by the Qing emperor to his amban in Lhasa in 1792 illustrates the gap between rules and reality since 1728:
Usually capable, competent officials are assigned to posts in the capital; those sent to t¡bet have been mostly mediocrities who did practically nothing but wait for the expiration of their tenures of office so they could return to Beijing. Because of that the da1a¡ 1ama and the kaloons [council ministers] were able to do whatever they wished in the administration of t¡betan affairs, ignoring the existence of these incompetent officials. That is how the Resident Official [amban ] has been reduced to nothing more than a figurehead. From now on the administration of t¡bet should be effectively supervised by the Resident Official; . . . the da1a¡ 1ama and the kaloons shall no longer be able to monopolize it.[17]
However, as the nineteenth century unfolded, the Qing dynasty experienced pressing threats to its position as a result of internal disturbances such as the Taiping Rebellion (1848–1865) and external incursions by Western countries such as the Opium War of 1839–1842. Not surprisingly, the power of the ambans in t¡bet waned, as did the involvement of the Qing emperors. Consequently, t¡bet was able to conduct a war with the Sikhs and Ladakh in 1841–1842 and another war with the Nepalese in 1855–1856 with no involvement from China, although in the latter conflict t¡bet was forced to pay Nepal an annual tribute and accept a Nepalese resident in Lhasa and extraterritoriality for Nepalese traders. Similarly, the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama was chosen in 1877 without recourse to the "golden urn" lottery that the Qing emperor, Qian Long, had ordered in 1792. And in 1897, two years after the thirteenth da1a¡ assumed political control, he stopped consulting the amban in the selection of top officials (in accordance with the 1792 regulations) and began appointing them directly. As Phuntso Tashi, the fourteenth da1a¡ 1ama's brother-in-law (and a former t¡betan government official) explains, "For over
― 22 ―
100 years t¡bet's holders of political power had not been able to do that. The Manchu government was displeased with this but . . . they were unable to do anything about it."[18] By the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the Qing hegemony over t¡bet was more symbolic than real, and the t¡bet Question was, in a sense, latent —t¡bet did not explicitly try to sever its ties to Beijing: it offered nominal respect to the emperor but did not defer to the emperor's amban in Lhasa.
That laissez-faire arrangement was permanently transformed when a third party entered the scene and set in motion a series of events that altered the status quo dramatically.
The British Enter the Picture
By the late nineteenth century British influence on the Indian subcontinent extended right to the border of t¡bet as the string of Himalayan states and principalities fell under British influence. As early as 1861 the British colonial government in India approved an "exploratory" mission to Lhasa if permits could be obtained from China. There was considerable hope that a flourishing trade might develop between t¡bet and India, with India siphoning up some of the substantial Sino-t¡betan trade in tea and manufactured goods and receiving wool, horns, skins, medicinal herbs, gold, musk, and so forth, from t¡bet. At that time t¡bet prohibited the importation of India tea. Britain secured China's approval for such a mission in the Chefu convention of 1876, which permitted India to send a "mission of exploration" from China to t¡bet either by way of Sichuan or Gansu, or from India.[19]
In 1886 a British mission—the Macaulay mission—was assembled in Sikkim to enter t¡bet. t¡betan opposition prevented its departure, but its presence prompted t¡bet to send troops into a border section of Sikkim it claimed as its own territory. This led in turn to a British attack in 1888 that drove the t¡betans out of the area. As a result of the fighting, the Manchu
― 23 ―
amban in Lhasa went to India for discussions with the British. These talks led to the treaty of 1890 in which Britain's protectorate over Sikkim was recognized by China, and the Sikkim-t¡bet border was delineated. Three years later, in 1893, a British trade treaty with China obtained Chinese acceptance of a "trade mart" at Yadong on the t¡betan side of the Sikkim-t¡bet border that would be open to all British subjects for commerce. The British government also secured the right to send officials to reside in Yadong (t¡bet) to oversee British trade there.
t¡bet, however, was not a party to these agreements and refused to cooperate in their implementation. A stalemate ensued. Such was the situation when Lord Curzon took office as the new viceroy of India in 1899. He realized that China had no practical control over events in t¡bet, so he obtained permission from London to try to initiate direct communication and relations with Lhasa. The thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama (who had assumed power in 1895) had no interest in relations with the British, so when Curzon sent him a series of letters, he returned them unopened with the reply that the Chinese would be displeased if the da1a¡ 1ama were to correspond with the British.[20] Unable to initiate face-to-face talks with the t¡betan government, Curzon next convinced London in 1903 to permit an expedition to enter t¡bet to force negotiations. The t¡betans refused to negotiate with this expedition, so its British officers and officials led their Indian troops deeper and deeper into t¡bet, ostensibly to induce negotiations. The t¡betan military attempted to block their advance, and a series of battles ensued in which the t¡betans were easily defeated, suffering losses of over a thousand troops. In the battle of Guru alone, between six hundred and seven hundred t¡betan troops were killed in a matter of minutes. No match for the invaders, the British force entered Lhasa, the capital of t¡bet, on August 3, 1904. They were the first Western troops ever to conquer t¡bet.
Throughout this period the Chinese government (through its amban ) urged the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama to negotiate with
― 24 ―
the British expeditionary force to prevent their further advance, and then when it was about to enter Lhasa, to meet with Younghusband, its leader. But China had no control over the da1a¡ 1ama, who ignored these admonitions and fled to exile in Mongolia, fearing he would be compelled to sign an unfavorable agreement. From Mongolia, the da1a¡ 1ama hoped to obtain the czar's support against Britain.
To secure the withdrawal of the British troops from Lhasa, the t¡betan officials left in charge by the da1a¡ 1ama reluctantly agreed to British terms, which were codified in an agreement known as the Anglo-t¡bet Convention of 1904. Signed by only t¡bet and the British head of the expeditionary force—the Manchu amban refused to place his signature on it—this agreement accepted Britain's protectorate over Sikkim and gave India (Britain) the right to establish trade marts with British trade officials in three t¡betan towns (Gyantse, Gartok, and Yadong). In a clause that was vague enough to exclude China as well as more obvious countries such as Russia it also forbade any other foreign power to exercise political influence in t¡bet. A large indemnity of £562,500 (7.5 million rupees) was levied and British troops were to occupy a part of t¡bet contiguous with Sikkim (Yadong's Chumbi Valley) until this was paid. It was also agreed that the British trade agent could visit Lhasa to discuss issues deriving from the treaty.[21] By virtue of these terms, British India virtually converted t¡bet into another of its "native-state" protectorates.
News of the fighting in t¡bet and the seizure of Lhasa shocked many in London who had not authorized Curzon to conquer t¡bet. Britain's interests transcended those of India, and considerations of Hong Kong and Russia quickly led the British foreign office to repudiate many of the political advantages secured via the Anglo-t¡betan Convention of 1904. The large indemnity was reduced by two thirds to £168,000, and British troops were prohibited from occupying the t¡betan Chumbi Valley for more than three years. Similarly, the right of
― 25 ―
the trade agent to visit Lhasa (and influence affairs there) was also unilaterally rescinded.
Nevertheless, the final Anglo-t¡betan accord opened up t¡bet to British interests. However, it also created a major diplomatic and legal problem regarding China. Because the amban had not signed the treaty (nor had the Chinese government approved it), unless London decided to forsake China's views and make t¡bet its dependency or accept its status as an independent country, it had to secure Chinese consent to its gains. The contradiction inherent in Britain's t¡bet strategy was that while Great Britain had to deal directly with the t¡betan government to achieve its ends, it had to deal with China to legitimize them.
For China, the whole affair was another humiliation suffered at the hands of the Western imperialists. From the Qing court's vantage, the da1a¡ 1ama had blithely ignored China's orders to negotiate with the British, so the British now had troops and officials resident in t¡bet. Moreover, the bilateral agreement Britain and t¡bet had signed contained an ambiguous clause that barred foreign powers from political influence in t¡bet. Given the way Western countries had treated China over the past half century, it was not difficult for Beijing to suspect that this was a British ploy to exclude them from t¡bet.
Fortunately for China, however, London's China policy did not favor transforming t¡bet into a British dependency, let alone accept it as an independent nation, and the British promptly assuaged China by entering into negotiations to obtain its acceptance of the convention Younghusband had signed with t¡bet. The resultant 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention modified the 1904 accord (without the involvement of t¡bet's government), reaffirming China's legitimate authority over its dependency t¡bet. The key articles in the convention said: "The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex t¡betan territory or to interfere in the administration of t¡bet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of t¡bet."
― 26 ―
And "The Concessions which are mentioned [in the 1904 convention] are denied to any state other than China."[22] Thus, at a time when China was unable to exercise real power in t¡bet, Britain unilaterally reaffirmed t¡bet's political subordination to China.
The next year an Anglo-Russian agreement further internationalized this situation, stating in article 2, "In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government."[23]
The Chinese Reaction
The invasion of t¡bet and the Lhasa Convention of 1904 dramatically altered Chinese policy toward t¡bet. Until then, the Qing dynasty had shown no interest in directly administering or sinicizing t¡bet. The British thrusts now suggested to Beijing that unless it took prompt action, its position as overlord in t¡bet might be lost, and with t¡bet under the British sphere of influence the English would be looking down from the t¡betan plateau on Sichuan, one of China's most important provinces. The Qing dynasty, although enfeebled and on the brink of collapse, responded with surprising vigor. Beijing got the British troops to leave t¡betan soil quickly by paying the indemnity to Britain itself and began to take a more active role in day-to-day t¡betan affairs. Britain's casual invasion of t¡bet, therefore, stimulated China to protect its national interests by beginning a program of closer cultural, economic, and political integration of t¡bet with the rest of China. At the same time, in the ethnographic t¡betan borderland, Zhao Erfeng initiated a major campaign that quickly converted most of the autonomous native t¡betan states into districts under Chinese magistrates. And, ominously, he launched an active attack on the position of the lamas and monasteries.
― 27 ―
At this time the da1a¡ 1ama was languishing in exile, spending time first in Outer Mongolia and then in the ethnic t¡betan areas of what is now Qinghai province. His overture to the Russian czar had proved futile and his position in exile was somewhat precarious since he had been "deposed" by the Chinese government in 1904 because of his flight. Although t¡betans never questioned his legitimacy as their ruler, the increased domination of affairs in Lhasa by the ambans after his departure made him reluctant to return to Lhasa without first achieving some accommodation with the Qing dynasty that would guarantee his control of t¡bet. In 1908, therefore, he went to Beijing. Arguing that the amban did not faithfully transmit his views to Beijing, the da1a¡ 1ama requested permission to petition the throne directly (i.e., to bypass the amban as was done before the 1792 reforms). Beijing, however, was in no mood to loosen its control over the unpredictable and independent-minded thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama and rudely refused, although it agreed to his return to t¡bet to rule. The Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Russian conventions had reaffirmed that t¡bet was a part of China, and the Qing court felt that it would be easier to control t¡bet through the da1a¡ 1ama than risk trying to replace him. But their view of his position can be seen from the humiliating new title they gave him: "loyal and submissive viceregent."[24]
Nevertheless, China did not trust the da1a¡ 1ama to be either loyal or submissive, so unbeknownst to him took steps to ensure he followed Beijing's instructions. Zhao Erfeng, the successful special commissioner who had brutally pacified the t¡betan areas of Sichuan and Yunnan, now sent an army of several thousand troops from Sichuan province to ensure that the da1a¡ 1ama remained compliant. As the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama arrived in Lhasa in late December 1909, five years after he had fled from the Younghusband expedition, he learned that this Chinese army was on its way. The da1a¡ 1ama, in desperation, sent the following poignant appeal to Britain:
― 28 ―
Though the Chinese and t¡betans are of one family, yet the Chinese officer Chao [Zhao] and the Amban Lien are plotting together against us, and have not sent true copies of our prοtests to the Chinese Emperor, but have altered them to suit their own evil purposes. They are sending troops into t¡bet and wish to abolish our religion. Please telegraph to the Chinese Emperor and request him to stop the troops now on their way. We are very anxious and beg the Powers to intervene and cause the withdrawal of the Chinese troops.[25]
And to the Chinese he wrote:
We, the oppressed t¡betans, send you this message. Though in outward appearance all is well, yet within big worms are eating little worms. We have acted frankly, but yet they steal our hearts. Troops have been sent into t¡bet, thus causing great alarm. We have already sent a messenger to Calcutta to telegraph everything in detail. Please recall the Chinese officer and troops who recently arrived in Kam. If you do not do so, there will be trouble.[26]
No one intervened, so as that army entered Lhasa in February 1910, the da1a¡ 1ama again fled into exile, this time south to his former enemies in British India.
China again deposed the da1a¡ 1ama and stepped up its efforts to expand its real control in t¡bet, its officials assuming more direct command of administration. A Chinese postal service was established and t¡bet's first stamps were produced (in Chinese and t¡betan script). t¡bet seemed set on a trajectory that would have ended in t¡bet's incorporation into China proper. This process, however, was abruptly halted when the Qing dynasty was overthrown in China in 1911.
To ethnic Chinese, the Qing emperors were foreigners who had destroyed China's greatness and relegated it to the pathetic status of "sick man of Asia." From the mid-nineteenth century, China had suffered one humiliation after another: its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895, for example, ended in the loss of Taiwan and southern Manchuria (the
― 29 ―
Liaoning Peninsula) to the Japanese together with the obligation to pay a huge indemnity. This was followed by the anti-Western, anti-Christian Boxer Uprising in 1900, which ended when a multinational Western army marched into Beijing and imposed further humiliating concessions and yet another huge indemnity.
Thus it was that the Chinese organized to overthrow the alien dynasty and restore China's greatness. The revolution began on October 10, 1911, in Wuchang, a town in western China, when soldiers killed their commander and took over the town. From there it spread quickly throughout the country, and four months later on February 12, 1912, the six-year-old Manchu emperor Puyi abdicated. Manchu rule in China was over. |
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tetrahedron
Seeker
Joined: Sep 29, 2004
Posts: 66
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Aug 10, 2007 - 07:58 AM |
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Interlude: De Facto Independence
The Simla Convention
While the Chinese army of 1910 occupied t¡bet, the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama lived in Darjeeling, India, contemplating the circumstances that had allowed Lhasa to be twice conquered within six years. During this time he developed a close friendship with Sir Charles Bell, the government of India's political officer in Sikkim, and learned a great deal about modern politics, seeing firsthand how an efficient and dedicated bureaucracy and army could rule a vast country. The beginnings of a new vision of t¡bet formed.
The fall of the Qing dynasty was a stroke of good fortune that the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama immediately capitalized on. From exile in India he organized a military force to regain his power, and with the help of Nepalese mediation in Lhasa, soon succeeded in expelling all Chinese officials and troops from t¡bet. The thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama triumphantly returned to Lhasa in 1913. Yuan Shikai, the provisional president of the new Chinese government that succeeded the Qing, sent the da1a¡ 1ama the following "reinstatement" telegram:
Now that the Republic has been firmly established and the Five Races [Han, t¡betan, Manchu, Mongol, Muslim] deeply united into one family, the da1a¡ 1ama is naturally moved with a feeling of deep attachment to the mother country. Under the circumstances, his former errors should be overlooked, and his
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Title of Loyal and Submissive Vice-Regent, Great, Good, and Self-Existent Buddha is hereby restored to him, in the hope that he may prove a support to the Yellow Church and a help to the Republic.[1]
The da1a¡ 1ama replied that he had not asked for his former rank from the Chinese government and that he "intended to exercise both temporal and ecclesiastic rule in t¡bet."[2] Many interpret this and a proclamation he issued twenty-two days after he returned as the equivalent of a declaration of independence.
The t¡bet Question, however, was far from settled since the new Chinese republican government took the position that the non-Chinese territories the Manchu emperors had subjugated—including t¡bet—were part of their republic. Sun Yatsen, the "father of the revolution," for example, was extremely nationalistic and had called for the creation of a strong Chinese state that would expel the Japanese from Manchuria, the Russians from Mongolia, and the British from t¡bet .[3] One of the fundamental nationalistic goals of the Chinese revolution, therefore, was to restore China to its former greatness, and regaining control of t¡bet took on great symbolic significance. Thus, on April 12, 1912, the new Chinese republic headed by Yuan Shikai issued an edict that declared t¡bet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang on equal footing with the provinces of China proper and as integral parts of the republic. Seats were set aside for t¡betans in the National Assembly and a five-colored flag was created, the black band representing t¡bet.[4] The t¡bet Question in its modern incarnation had been born.
Given the conflicting national aspirations, t¡bet clearly had to reach some accommodation with China regarding its political status or be prepared to defend its territory and newly declared "independence." As we shall see, it turned out to be unable to do the former and unwilling to take the steps needed to do the latter. With no effective army at its disposal, t¡bet sought to reach an agreement with China's new rulers and received
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support in this from a new friend—British India. The government of British India had found China a bad neighbor during the 1905–1911 period of direct Chinese power in t¡bet. Chinese officials manning the long Indo-t¡betan border seemed to the English to be using their power to foment trouble among the Indian border tribes. Britain therefore sought to prevent the recurrence of direct Chinese control by creating a buffer state in t¡bet. In 1913, with the intent of achieving that end, Britain pressured the new Chinese republican government to participate in a conference with itself and t¡bet in Simla, India. The Simla negotiations produced a draft convention in 1914 that set the background for the t¡bet Question during the next four decades.
t¡bet initially wanted the conference to declare it independent. Shatra, the t¡betan plenipotentiary, expressed this in his opening statement when he said: "t¡bet and China have never been under each other and will never associate with each other in future. It is decided that t¡bet is an independent State and that the precious Protector, the da1a¡ 1ama, is the ruler of t¡bet in all temporal as well as in spiritual affairs."[5] China, on the other hand, forcefully claimed the opposite in its initial Simla statement: "t¡bet forms an integral part of the territory of the Republic of China, that no attempts shall be made by t¡bet or by Great Britain to interrupt the continuity of this territorial integrity, and that China's rights of every description which have existed in consequence of this territorial integrity shall be respected by t¡bet and recognized by Great Britain."[6]
t¡bet's only hope of achieving its aim was for Great Britain to act as its champion. British strategic aims, however, were not congruent with those of Lhasa. As in 1904, London did not want to support an independent t¡bet or convert t¡bet into an Indian protectorate as it had done in the case of Sikkim and Bhutan. London was still unwilling to face the international criticism that support for t¡bet's claim to independence would engender and was also fearful of negatively impacting British
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trade interests in China and Hong Kong. So Britain proposed that t¡bet be accepted as a self-governing dominion nominally under China but with Chinese influence and power severely limited.
The final draft of the Simla Convention therefore declared that t¡bet would be autonomous from China, but also acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over t¡bet. t¡betans would administrate t¡bet with its own officials in accordance with its own customs and laws, and China would not be permitted to station large numbers of troops or officials in t¡bet—but China could maintain a commissioner in Lhasa and an escort of up to three hundred men. This compromise was not the independence t¡bet wanted, but nonetheless did guarantee that it would retain complete control over its affairs, including the army, currency, and all other important functions. It would also legitimize an international identity for t¡bet and spare it the burden of having to prepare for possible military conflict with China. Britain, of course, achieved exactly what it had sought—a harmless buffer zone along India's northern border in which its political interests were fulfilled and its commercial interests could develop.
The t¡betan and Chinese plenipotentiaries at Simla agreed to this political compromise but found it impossible to agree where to draw the boundary between political t¡bet and China. At issue was ethnographic t¡bet, the belt of semiautonomous ethnic t¡betan areas in eastern t¡bet and western Sichuan. t¡bet insisted that all ethnographic t¡bet be included in its territory while China claimed its border began a mere one hundred twenty-five miles east of Lhasa. British mediation produced a number of compromises including an Inner and Outer t¡bet analogous to Inner and Outer Mongolia, but in the end the new Chinese government repudiated the final border and refused to ratify the Simla Convention.
Sir Henry McMahon, the British representative, now sought permission from London to sign the convention directly with
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t¡bet. The foreign office, however, balked, concluding that this would be tantamount to a formal recognition of t¡betan independence. Nevertheless, since British India had clear strategic goals it needed to meet, something had to be done. In the end it devised an ingenious innovation to secure its goal. McMahon was authorized to sign a bilateral note with t¡bet that bound each side to the terms of the unsigned Simla Convention. Although this was not a real treaty, British India then felt justified in pursuing its relations with t¡bet in accordance with the "autonomy" stipulated in the terms of the unsigned Simla Convention, and continued to do so for the next thirty-five years. It also obtained from t¡bet a vast territory east of Bhutan (today's Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh). Here we see the beginnings of what we can think of as the "bad friend syndrome"—Western powers professing friendship for t¡bet but refusing to support it in its fundamental objective of political independence while actually bolstering China's claim of real ownership.
For t¡bet, Simla did nothing to resolve the t¡bet Question. Since China did not agree to the convention, t¡bet still had no de jure status accepted by China. And the new Anglo-t¡betan note provided no guarantees that the British would militarily defend the rights specified in the Simla Convention if China sought to enforce its claim over t¡bet by force. Britain was willing to accept t¡bet's right to cede the vast territory of Arunachal Pradesh independent of China's wishes, but was unwilling to acknowledge that such authority validated t¡bet's assertion of independence.[7]
t¡betan Attempts to Modernize
The failure of Simla meant that t¡bet had to face the possibility of future hostilities with China. This threat prompted a clique of young t¡betan aristocratic officials led by Tsarong, a favorite of the da1a¡ 1ama, to urge modernization in t¡bet, especially
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the creation of a strong military able to defend t¡bet's interests. The thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama agreed, and in rapid succession new troops were levied and officers and NCOs were sent for training to India and the British trade agency in the southern t¡betan town of Gyantse. At the same time, t¡bet considered joining the International Postal Union, and a British schoolmaster was hired to open an English language school in Gyantse. t¡bet was taking its first steps to join the modern world.
All this, however, sent shock waves through the monastic and aristocratic elites who held most of the land in t¡bet in the form of feudal estates with hereditarily bound serflike peasants. Modernization was expensive, and they found themselves facing new tax levies to support the military buildup. Modernization, moreover, was also perceived by the religious leadership as an ideological threat to the dominance of Buddhism in t¡bet, and thus to what they felt was the unique character of the t¡betan theocratic state. Equating modernization with Western atheism and secularism, the conservatives believed that it would diminish the power and importance of Buddhism. In their view, t¡bet had coexisted with China for centuries with no adverse consequences for the domination of Buddhism (and the Geluk sect) in t¡bet, so why, they questioned, was it now necessary to transform t¡bet in these radical ways? Key conservative officials therefore campaigned to convince the da1a¡ 1ama that the military officers were a threat to Buddhism and to his own power and authority. By the mid-1920s, their efforts had succeeded, and in one of the pivotal policy decisions of modern t¡betan history, the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama gutted the heart of the reform program by demoting the entire group of promodernization officers and closing the English school. Overnight, t¡bet lost its best chance to create a modern polity capable of coordinating international support for its independent status and defending its territory.[8]
t¡bet did not, however, pay an immediate price for this retreat into the past because China was deeply absorbed in
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internal issues and conflicts and too weak to challenge the da1a¡ 1ama. Thus, from 1913 when the last Qing officials and troops left t¡bet to the death of the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama in 1933, no Chinese officials or troops were permitted to reside in t¡bet, and the t¡betan government accepted no interference from Beijing. Chinese fortunes in t¡bet improved slightly after the death of the thirteenth da1a¡ 1ama when t¡bet allowed a "condolence mission" sent by the Guomindang government of Chiang Kaishek to visit Lhasa, and then permitted it to open an office to facilitate negotiations aimed at resolving the t¡bet Question. These talks proved futile, but t¡bet allowed the office to remain.
The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 saved t¡bet from having to defend its de facto independence from China, and t¡bet continued to operate without interference from Chiang Kaishek. China did not, however, abandon its claims over t¡bet. To the contrary, it effectively reinforced its position throughout the world (and in China itself) with a propaganda campaign that actively sought to create the impression that t¡bet was in fact a part of China. t¡bet, with virtually no officials who understood the West or spoke English, blithely ignored this ominous development, much as it had earlier closed its eyes to reality and returned British governmental correspondence unopened. |
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Andreas
Board Royalty
Joined: Feb 27, 2004
Posts: 6332
Location: 31 N 121 E
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| Posted:
Aug 10, 2007 - 10:31 AM |
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Interesting reading. Thanks for sharing! |
_________________
If it has tits, tires, or a transom, there's gonna be issues! |
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tetrahedron
Seeker
Joined: Sep 29, 2004
Posts: 66
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| Posted:
Aug 11, 2007 - 07:47 PM |
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| Andreas wrote: |
| Interesting reading. Thanks for sharing! |
You are welcome. I have high regard for anyone spending time reading this apparently long article (not too long for a book).
Chinese Communist Rule: The Mao Era
Victory in World War II did not enable China to address the t¡bet Question since full-blown civil war broke out between the government of Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese Communist party led by Mao Zedong. The Chinese Communists emerged victorious four years later, and on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong inaugurated the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Settlement of the t¡betan Question at this time was no closer than it had been at the fall of the Qing dynasty. t¡bet was still operating as a de facto independent polity in all ways, although it was militarily weak and internally disunified due to a 1947 outbreak of bitter fighting between Sera monastery and the government over the regency of the fourteenth da1a¡ 1ama. t¡bet had also failed to secure international support for its claim to independence. Britain and India (and later the United States) dealt directly with t¡bet as if it were an independent state, but continued to acknowledge de jure Chinese suzerainty over t¡bet. That is, they considered t¡bet a part of China. Much of the current confusion over t¡bet's previous political status derives from this Western double standard.
One example of this occurred in 1943 when the United States wanted to send two OSS (Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA) officers to t¡bet to travel overland to China and assess the potential for construction of roads and airfields. The United States asked their close ally Chiang Kaishek to arrange this, but since China exercised no control over t¡bet, the t¡betan government turned down his request.
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The United States was then forced to ask the British (who had a representative in Lhasa) to secure permission directly from Lhasa. After the t¡betan government was assured that this was a genuine and potentially beneficial U.S. government mission, the t¡betan foreign affairs bureau extended the two OSS officers an invitation. They entered t¡bet from India carrying presents and a letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to the young fourteenth da1a¡ 1ama asking him to assist the officers. Dated July 3, 1942, the letter said:
Your HOLINESS: Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilyia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such an opportunity.
As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of twenty-seven other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the world by nations bent on conquest who are intent on destroying freedom of thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The united Nations are fighting today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our determination is unshakable.
I am asking Ilyia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token of my friendly sentiment toward you.
With cordial greetings [etc.]
Franklin D. Roosevelt[1]
Although this must have looked like government-to-government relations to officials in Lhasa, in Washington it was not considered such. Despite the strong Wilsonian commitment to self-determination in the United States[2] and the 1941 Atlantic Charter in which Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to "respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live,"[3] the United States refused to support t¡betan independence or its right to self-determination. In this case, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
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informed President Roosevelt that this letter was addressed to the da1a¡ 1ama in his religious capacity, "rather than in his capacity of secular leader of t¡bet, so as not to offend the Chinese Government which includes t¡bet in the territory of the Republic of China."[4] This policy made sense given China's importance as a U.S. ally in World War II, but neither the t¡betan government nor the da1a¡ 1ama was informed of this subtlety. t¡betans, therefore, had no reason to assume the letter was not sent to the da1a¡ 1ama as head of t¡bet, or that it failed to demonstrate tacit U.S. recognition of t¡bet's independence.
A more blatant incident occurred in 1948 when the t¡betan government sent a trade mission to the United States and Britain, using its own passports. British officials in Hong Kong stamped these with entry visas valid for three months. The British visas expired while the t¡betans were in the United States, and when the t¡betans went for what they thought were routine new visas, their request was denied. The Chinese government in the interim had confronted the British government about the potential implications of accepting t¡betan passports when according to its official position it did not accept that t¡bet was independent. The British foreign office then reversed itself and assured the Chinese that a mistake had been made, promising that in the future they would issue no more visas on t¡betan passports. The t¡betans were advised to accept entry visas on a separate piece of paper called an "Affidavit of Identity." Surprised and indignant, the delegation refused, saying they would rather not visit Britain than accept this. Since this would have dismayed the friends of t¡bet in England, London devised an ingenious solution that truly typifies the double standards rampant at this time. They carefully crossed out the words "three months" on the expired visa stamp and neatly wrote in pen above it, "nine months." This allowed them to keep their promise to the Chinese government not to issue the t¡betans new visas on their passports since this was still the original visa. At the same time they were also able to welcome the t¡betans to Britain on their t¡betan government-issued passports.
It is instructive to contrast t¡bet's experiences with those of Mongolia. At the fall of the Qing dynasty Mongolia had a political status parallel to that of t¡bet, and like t¡bet, sought to become independent. Mongolia, however, underwent a Communist revolution and became part of the Soviet bloc. It maintained extremely close relations with the USSR, with thousands of Russians working in Mongolia and large numbers of Mongolians studying in the Soviet Union. Mongolian troops also fought side by side with their Russian allies against the Japanese in a key battle in 1939 at Nomonkhan, where the Japanese northern advance was stopped.[5] However, like t¡bet, Mongolian independence was de facto not de jure, and Chiang Kaishek continued to claim it as part of China.
The Russian victory in WWII quickly changed that. Unlike the Western democracies, the USSR supported Mongolia's claim to independence after World War II. Stalin considered a friendly buffer state important and persuaded President Roosevelt at Yalta to agree to a plebiscite for independence in Mongolia. When the results of the plebiscite unanimously favored independence from China, the USSR and the United States persuaded Chiang Kaishek to accept the vote. As a result, Mongolia today is an independent country and a member of the United Nations.
In contrast, t¡bet's political subordination to China was repeatedly validated by the West throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and particularly in the critical years during and immediately following World War II. Despite lofty rhetoric about freedom and self-determination, Western democracies maintained a consistent policy of yielding to Chinese sensibilities, accepting the official Chinese position that t¡bet was one of the territories comprised by the Chinese nation.
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